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RECONSIDERING THE MISTAKE OF LAW 
DEFENSE 
EDWIN MEESE III & PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.

 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
The criminal law is rife with old saws.
1
  For example, there is the tenet 
that there can be no crime or criminal punishment without a positive law, 
known in Latin as “Nullum crimen sine lege” and “Nulla poena sine lege.”2  
Another such proposition is that a crime consists of “a vicious will” and “an 
unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.”3  Also widely known are 
the principles that every person is entitled to a presumption of innocence
4
 
and that it is the government’s burden to rebut that presumption beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
5
  Another maxim, the lex talionis, is “An eye for an eye, a 
tooth for a tooth,”6 which can be rephrased as “The punishment should fit 
 
 Edwin Meese III is the former Attorney General of the United States and currently is 
the Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman of the Center for 
Legal and Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation.  Paul J. Larkin, Jr., is the Manager of 
the Overcriminalization Project at The Heritage Foundation.  Both would like to thank 
Austin Lipari, Joseph Luppino-Esposito, and Christopher Tosetti for their invaluable 
research assistance. 
1 The civil law, too.  For example, every consumer has heard (often to his chagrin) the 
maxim “Caveat emptor” or “Let the buyer beware.” See Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 
Wall.) 383, 389 (1870). 
2 Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165, 178 (1937). 
3 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 251 (1952).  For Latin buffs, the phrase is “Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.” 
Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
317, 317 (2009). 
4 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483–86 (1978); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 
501, 503 (1976); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453–61 (1895); MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed. 1972). 
5 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
361–62 (1970). 
6 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37 (1968).  Talionic 
law sought to moderate punishment, not encourage retribution.  THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE PRISON, at x (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995). 
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the crime.”  And there is the well-known saying, drawn from the Bible,7 
that “It is better that ten guilty men go free than that one innocent man be 
convicted.”8  Finally, an old criminal law proverb is the proposition that 
“Ignorance of the law is no excuse,” which sometimes is phrased as a rule 
of evidence that “Every man is presumed to know the law.”9 
The ignorance-of-the-law rule traces its lineage back to Roman law.
10
  
The English common law courts adopted the rule,
11
 from whence it came to 
America.  In this country, state
12
 and federal courts,
13
 including the 
 
7 See Genesis 18:23–32 (relating how God agrees to spare Sodom if ten righteous men 
can be found there). 
8 See Coffin, 156 at 456 (“[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent 
suffer.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; Alexander Volokh, Guilty Men, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997).  Benjamin Franklin put the number at 100.  Id. at 175. 
9 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 15–16 
(1957); Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 
80 (1908) (both discussing the alternative ways of stating the point). 
10 See Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 671, 685 (1976).  Roman law, however, distinguished between “ignorance as a defense 
to actions under the jus gentium, the law derived from the common customs of the Italian 
tribes and thought to embody the basic rules of conduct any civilized person would deduce 
from proper reasoning,” to which a mistake of law defense could not be raised, and “the 
more compendious and less common-sense jus civile,” as to which “women, males less than 
25 years old, soldiers, peasants, and persons of small intelligence” could raise a mistake 
defense if he or she “had not had the opportunity to consult counsel familiar with the laws.”  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
11 See, e.g., 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 480–81 (5th ed. 1885); 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *26; M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (1680); 
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27–69 (2d ed. 1947); 3 W.S. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 374 (1966); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 45–46 (Belknap Press, 2009) (1881); COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, OUTLINES 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 68–69 (13th ed. 1929); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6, (5th ed. 
2010); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 426 (8th ed. 1930); 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94–95 (1883); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART §§ 52–74 (2d ed. 1961); Cass, supra note 10, at 685; 
Hall, supra note 9; Rollin M. Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. PA. L. 
REV. 35 (1939).  The rule has been traced back to the thirteenth century.  Keedy, supra note 
9, at 78.  
12 See, e.g., Schuster v. State, 48 Ala. 199, 202–03 (1872); State v. Paup, 13 Ark. 129, 
137–38 (1852); People v. O’Brien, 31 P. 45, 47–48 (Cal. 1892); Fraser v. State, 37 S.E. 114, 
116 (Ga. 1900); People v. Cohn, 193 N.E. 150, 153 (Ill. 1934); Winehart v. State, 6 Ind. 30 
(1854); State v. O’Neil, 126 N.W. 454, 456 (Iowa 1910); Jellico Coal Min. Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 29 S.W. 26, 26–27 (Ky. 1895); State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, 33 (1876); 
Grumbine v. State, 60 Md. 355, 356 (1883); Commonwealth v. Everson, 2 N.E. 839, 840 
(Mass. 1885); Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191, 201 (1873); State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29, 
38 (1878); Whitton v. State, 37 Miss. 379, 382 (1859); State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 529 
(1881); Pisar v. State, 76 N.W. 869, 870 (Neb. 1898); State v. Carver, 39 A. 973, 974 (N.H. 
1898); State v. Halsted, 39 N.J.L. 402, 412–13 (1877); Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299, 304 
(1875); State v. Boyett, 32 N.C. (10 Ired. Eq.) 336, 343 (1849); State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 
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Supreme Court of the United States,
14
 as well as criminal law treatise 
writers,
15
 have long endorsed that rule.  The proposition that ignorance or 
mistake of the law is no excuse therefore has an ancient pedigree. 
Most rules of law that have survived that long have a fairly robust 
justification, even if it is not the same one that gave birth to the rule.
16
  
Moreover, criminal justice principles repeatedly and recently championed 
by the Supreme Court have the highest precedential value.
17
  The rule that 
mistake of law is no excuse fits into that category. 
 
342, 346 (N.D. 1955); Ulsamer v. State, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 889 (Ohio C.C. 1893); 
Needham v. State, 32 P.2d 92, 93 (Okla. Crim. App. 1934); State v. Foster, 46 A. 833, 835 
(R.I. 1900); State v. S. D. Packing & Shipping Co., 180 N.W. 510, 511 (S.D. 1920); 
McGuire v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 54, 55–56 (1846); Medrano v. State, 22 S.W. 684 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1893); State v. Woods, 179 A. 1, 2 (Vt. 1935).  Some states now have codified 
the rule.  See, e.g., People v. Mann, 646 P.2d 352, 356 (Colo. 1982) (discussing state 
statute).  
13 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 239 F. 130, 131 (2d Cir. 1917); 
Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 243 (6th Cir. 1905); Blumenthal v. United States, 88 
F.2d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 1937); Fall v. United States, 209 F. 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1913); 
Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1938); United States v. Anthony, 24 
F. Cas. 829, 831–32 (C.N.D.N.Y. 1873).  For some possible exceptions to this rule, see 
Barker v. United States, 546 F.2d 940, 946–54 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wilkey, J., concurring) 
(reliance upon official authority); id. at 954–57 (Merhige, J., concurring) (reliance upon an 
official interpretation of the law).  
14 See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998); Cheek v. United States, 
498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119–24 (1974); United 
States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971); Lambert v. California, 
355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 
(1912); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); Armour Packing Co. v. 
United States, 209 U.S. 56, 85 (1907); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) 
(“Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent, but 
not ignorance of the law.”); Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (“It is 
a common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any 
person, either civilly or criminally.”); The Joseph, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 451 (1814). 
15 See, e.g., 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 294–300 (5th 
ed. 1872); 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 399 (11th ed. 1912). 
16
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is this.  The 
customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula.  In the course of 
centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.  The reason which 
gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is 
to be accounted for.  Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to 
reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons 
which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.  The old form receives a new content, 
and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received. 
HOLMES, supra note 11, at 5. 
17 A value that the legislature may not erase.  In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 432 (2000), the Supreme Court turned aside the claim that Congress had repealed 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
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An ancient pedigree for a rule, however, does not guarantee that the 
rule still makes sense and therefore should not serve to defeat all efforts at 
reexamination.  The rules that govern society today must make sense today, 
whatever their merit long ago.  Law is the formal recognition of the mores 
and values of a society and should be adjusted to fit whatever changes 
society deems necessary.  Sometimes that adjustment cannot be done 
without revisiting, reshaping, or abandoning law on the statute books or in 
the case reports.  When that happens, the society is better off by altering the 
law to fit current needs than by trying to force the latter into the former.  
That makes particular sense here, where the question of whether a mistake 
of law defense should be permitted is a matter of federal common law, not 
statutory interpretation.  The common law adapts to changed circumstances 
and the lessons of accumulated experience.
18
  That is its biggest strength 
and virtue.  The Supreme Court has made clear that, in limited 
circumstances, federal courts have authority to develop substantive federal 
common law,
19
 and it effectively has treated defenses to federal crimes as 
falling within that authority.
20





18 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 234–35 (1995) (“[I]n our system 
of adjudication, principles seldom can be settled ‘on the basis of one or two cases, but 
require a closer working out.’” (quoting Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 
14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 339 (1940))); Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Creativity” and “Tradition,” 
44 J. HIST. IDEAS 105, 112 (1983) (“We should realize from the beginning that a completely 
stable or rigid tradition that never admits change is humanly impossible and has never 
existed.”). 
19 The Supreme Court has noted that it has limited authority to create federal common 
law, but, where it enjoys that sanction, the Court has greater freedom to shape the 
development of federal common law than to change its interpretation of federal statutes.  
That authority generally is confined to subjects such as the reach of federal sovereign 
immunity, the obligations of the federal government, and interstate disputes over (for 
instance) geographic boundaries and water rights.  See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. 
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 86–88, 95–98 (1981). 
20 See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548–49 (1992) (entrapment 
defense); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–15 (1980) (duress or necessity 
defense); United States v. Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673–75 (1973) (defense 
of reliance on opinions of government officials interpreting a federal law within their 
jurisdiction); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) (reliance on advice of 
private counsel); Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1921) (self-defense); Rowe 
v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 555–58 (1896) (self-defense); Beard v. United States, 158 
U.S. 550, 555–56 (1895) (self-defense); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 476–77 
(1895) (insanity defense).  See generally LAFAVE, supra note 11, §§ 7.1–7.5, 9.1–9.8, 10.1–
10.7 (discussing defenses).  By contrast, federal courts do not have authority to create 
common law crimes.  See, e.g., United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 
33 (1812). 
21 The federal antitrust laws are a good example, because the Court has felt free over 
time to develop a federal common law of competition that is sufficiently flexible to adapt to 
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That proposition is relevant here because the criminal justice system 
has undergone a complete transformation since the days of Blackstone.  
Legislatures and courts have made vast changes to the structure of the 
criminal justice system, to the officials who comprise that system, and to 
the procedures that govern how those actors play their roles.  Those 
developments may have greatly altered the landscape that gave rise to the 
common law mistake of law rule—so much so, in fact, that it might no 
longer make sense to follow the rule.  If so, the courts should own up to the 
responsibility of “retiring” it.22  As Justice Frankfurter once sagely noted, 
“[w]isdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely 
because it comes late.”23 
Start with the structure of the system.  At common law, sheriffs were 
the principal law enforcement officers.  They could conscript the public into 
assisting by invoking the “hue and cry,” an ancient means of corralling 
local citizens into acting as what in the American West would have been 
known as a “posse.”24  In colonial America citizens also served as 
“watchmen”—that is, ordinary private parties, acting as amateur law 
enforcement officers, who patrolled the streets and made arrests.
25
  Today, 
we have large-scale police departments in many municipalities—to say 
nothing of the additional, sizeable cadre of state and federal law 
enforcement personnel
26—and we use a full-time professional force to 
investigate crimes and apprehend suspects.
27
  Today’s parole and probation 
officers have no common law ancestor, since neither probation nor parole 
 
new business arrangements and developments in microeconomics.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 551 U.S. 877, 899–900 (2007); State Oil Co., v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 
10–15 (1997); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–59 (1977). 
22 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007), the Supreme Court 
decided to “retire,” rather than overrule, the pleading standard previously articulated in 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).  The term is apt here as well. 
23 Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
24 “Hue” derives from the French word huer, meaning “to shout,” and cry is used in the 
same sense.  “The person discovering a felony would raise a cry of ‘Out! Out!’ Prompting 
the neighbors to turn out with their bows, arrows, and knives.  The ‘hue’ would be passed by 
horn-blowing from town to town until the ad hoc posse caught the malefactor or gave up the 
chase.”  Jon C. Blue, High Noon Revisited: Commands of Assistance by Peace Officers in 
the Age of the Fourth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1475, 1479–84 & 1480 n.21 (1992); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 24–27, 67–71 
(1993) (discussing common law practices in the courts and by sheriffs and citizens). 
25 William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The 
Return of the Victim, in VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5–6, 11–12 (3d ed. 2010); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 28. 
26 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 65 (2011); Blue, 
supra note 24, at 1484. 
27 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 67–71, 149–55, 358–60. 
730 EDWIN MEESE III & PAUL J. LARKIN, JR. [Vol. 102 
existed at common law.
28
  There are specialized courts, such as so-called 
drug courts,
29
 that did not exist thirty years ago, let alone 300.
30
  And the 
facilities housing the nation’s prisoners today were unknown at common 
law.  The principal sanctions imposed at common law and in colonial 
America were fines, the stocks, whipping, banishment, and the death 
penalty.
31
  “Penitentiaries” were a nineteenth-century invention.32 
The rules of criminal pretrial and trial procedure are also vastly 
different today.
33




28 In America, probation and parole were born in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  E.g., Parole Act, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819 (1910); Probation Act, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 
1259 (1925); see, e.g., United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 353–58 (1928); Ex parte 
United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42–52 (1916); Cosgrove v. Smith, 697 F.2d 1125, 1135–37 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); FRIEDMAN, supra note 
24, at 161–63, 406–09; JOAN PETERSILIA, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 9–10 (1998). 
29 See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS 40–41, 161–63 (2009) 
(discussing purpose of drug courts). 
30 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 24–25, 67, 163–66, 239–50 (discussing courts from 
common law days through the twentieth century). 
31 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 52–53 (rev. ed. 1990). 
32 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 219–20 (3d ed. 2005); 
ROTHMAN, supra note 31, at 79–108.  Jails housed defendants awaiting trial or execution, the 
dangerously mentally ill, misdemeanants, petty offenders, and debtors.  ROTHMAN, supra 
note 31, at xxvii–xxviii, 52–53.  Prisons have existed as restraints on freedom as early as 
ancient Egypt and Greece, Edward M. Peters, Prison Before the Prison: The Ancient and 
Medieval Worlds, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 6, at 5–21, but the 
belief that incarceration could be used to reform an inmate via “penance” did not occur until 
the early nineteenth century in America, ROTHMAN, supra note 31, at xxiv, 79–108. 
33 Judges created common law trial procedures.  The trial process was both more 
informal in some respects and more rigid in others than the trials seen today.  See, e.g., 
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United 
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century 
Criminal Trial: A View From the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1983); John H. 
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1978).  For a 
concise discussion of English common law criminal procedure, see THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 424–41 (5th ed. 1956).  For a concise 
discussion of American criminal procedure from the colonial period through the nineteenth 
century, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 20–27, 235–58, 383–418. 
34 At common law, a victim had to pursue a prosecution, because there was no office of 
public prosecutor.  State and federal governments later established such an office, 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 21, 29–30, and it is the standard practice everywhere today.  
Similarly, at common law, a defendant charged with a felony was not entitled to be 
represented by counsel (although, ironically, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor was).  
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 27.  By 
contrast, today a defendant cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment without first 
being afforded the right to obtain counsel or to have counsel appointed if he is indigent.  See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).  A defendant’s right to counsel comes into 
play at pretrial proceedings, at trial, at sentencing, and at his first appeal of right.  See, e.g., 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135–37 (1967) (sentencing); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
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intricacy of the rules of procedure
35
 would stun a judge in the colonies or in 
the Old Bailey;
36
 and defendants have postconviction avenues open to them 
that were unheard of at common law.
37
  Atop all that is the work of the 
Supreme Court.  Over the last sixty years we have witnessed a blizzard of 
Supreme Court decisions analyzing virtually every facet of the investigative 










59, 60 (1963) (preliminary hearing); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355–58 (1963) 
(first appeal of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (trial); Hamilton 
v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53–55 (1961) (arraignment). 
35 For example, at common law a defendant could offer an unsworn statement on his own 
behalf but could not testify in his defense because he was deemed an “incompetent” witness 
due to his interest in the outcome.  See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 576–79 (2d ed. 1923).  
Today, a defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his defense.  See Rock v. Arkansas, 
483 U.S. 44 (1987); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
36 The Old Bailey was the trial court for felonies and other serious crimes in London and 
adjacent Middlesex County in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Langbein, supra 
note 33, at 3. 
37 The common law in England and in the early days in the United States offered scant 
opportunity for a defendant to obtain a new trial.  See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 408–
10 (1993); FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 255–58.  The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 
73, did not establish a right to appeal a conviction in a federal criminal case.  Congress did 
not create a right to appeal in capital cases until 1889, Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 
Stat. 655, 656, and did not extend that right to all convicted defendants until 1891, The 
Circuit Courts of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891).  Shortly 
thereafter, the Supreme Court held that defendants have no constitutional right to an appeal, 
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894), thereby making clear that appellate rights 
were up to the legislatures to define.  As for postconviction avenues, The Judiciary Act of 
1789 extended the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to parties held in federal 
custody, but Congress did not grant parties in state custody that opportunity until the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385.  Today, federal habeas corpus is governed by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2006)).  Finally, while the Constitution 
vests the clemency power in the President, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, it does not require 
the states to have a clemency process, Herrera, 506 U.S. at 414. 
38 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (finding that the government’s brief 
detention for questioning of a person is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and a “pat 
down” of his clothing for weapons is a “search”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–
59 (1967) (holding that government’s warrantless recording of a telephone conversation is a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment). 
39 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause requires “use immunity” in order for the government 
to compel a person to testify over a self-incrimination claim); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966) (requiring that a person in custody be advised of his rights to remain silent 
and to speak with an attorney before being questioned in order for any statement to be 
admissible); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1965) (holding that the Self-
Incrimination Clause prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on the defendant’s decision 
not to testify at his trial); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (holding that the 
Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial of an acquitted defendant). 
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Fourteenth
42
 Amendments, as well as the various mechanisms for enforcing 
what the Constitution guarantees.
43
  The result is that, with the dual (albeit 
 
40 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him and therefore limits use at trial of out-of-court statements); Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial 
Clause guarantees a defendant the right to have the jury make all findings necessary for a 
sentence to be imposed in excess of the statutory maximum); Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201, 204–05 (1964) (holding that the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause prohibits the 
police from deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from a charged suspect in the 
absence of counsel or a waiver); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding 
that the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause guarantees an indigent defendant charged with a 
felony the right to the appointment of trial counsel at state expense); see generally Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 716 (2012) (discussing Sixth Amendment fair trial 
guarantees). 
41 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did 
not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 569–75 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death 
penalty on minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants); 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ruling that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits only grossly disproportionate terms of imprisonment); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (rejecting the claim that the death penalty is 
invariably a cruel and unusual punishment and upholding a capital sentencing scheme that 
guided the jury’s discretion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (upholding challenge 
based on the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to purely 
discretionary capital sentencing schemes). 
42 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86 (1985) (stating that due process requires 
that an indigent defendant be provided psychiatric assistance when the defendant shows that 
sanity will be a significant issue at trial); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294–303 
(1973) (finding due process violated when state evidentiary rules excluded compelling 
evidence of innocence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that due 
process requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory information to the defense); Tumey 
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (explaining that due process is violated when town 
mayor-and-judge receives fees only for cases resulting in a conviction). 
43 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (adopting an exclusionary 
rule to suppress evidence obtained by federal law enforcement officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 619 (2012) (declining to imply a 
Bivens action for federal prisoners raising tort claims against a privately managed prison’s 
personnel); Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–29 (2011); United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 912 (1984) (adopting a “reasonable mistake” exception to the Weeks 
exclusionary rule); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (ruling that the victim of an unconstitutional search can bring a 
damages action against the responsible government officials); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 178 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 
U.S. 658 (1978) (explaining that Section 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)), provides a private party with a remedy 
against state and local officials for a violation of the Constitution); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 656 (1961) (applying the Weeks exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by state law 
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important) exceptions of plea bargaining
44
 and non-capital sentencing,
45
 
there is scarcely any feature of the criminal pretrial and trial processes
46
 that 
is not primarily governed by federal constitutional law.
47
 
The contemporary penal code also is vastly different from what existed 
at common law.  The common law recognized a limited number of crimes.  
Treason, murder, rape, robbery, larceny in some form, and a small number 




enforcement officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 136 (2009), Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–99 (2006), and 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1995) (all applying the Leon exception in various non-
warrant contexts).   
44 The Constitution plays a limited role in regulating the plea-bargaining process.  In 
general, plea bargaining between the prosecutor and defense counsel does not violate a 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege or Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial.  See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742 (1970).  The Constitution does require a prosecutor to keep his promises if the 
defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain.  See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S. 257 (1971).  Absent case-specific proof of racial animus or some other invidious or 
retaliatory intent, see, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), however, the 
Constitution does not bar a prosecutor from making good on his promise to throw the book 
at a defendant who declines a plea offer.  See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 
(1978).  On plea bargaining generally, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 
(2003); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979).  
45 Capital sentencing procedures have been strictly regulated by the Eighth Amendment 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause ever since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  
The same strict rules do not apply to non-capital sentencing.  Compare, e.g., Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1949) (explaining due process does not require disclosure 
to the defense of any information used to impose a death sentence), with, e.g., Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (holding, post-Furman, that due process requires 
disclosure to the defense of any information used to impose a death sentence; overruling 
Williams for capital cases). 
46 The post-trial process is in a different category.  The Constitution does not guarantee a 
defendant the right to take an appeal, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 686–88 (1894), 
but, if a state creates an appellate process, the Constitution plays a limited role in regulating 
access to it, see, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (holding that an 
indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel on his first appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 16–19 (1956) (holding that indigent defendants have a right to a free trial 
transcript for appeal). 
47 Even those two excepted fields eventually may be smothered by federal constitutional 
law.  See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012) (holding that defense 
counsel’s failure to advise a defendant of a favorable plea offer allows a prisoner to 
challenge his later guilty plea); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1382 (2012) (holding that 
defense counsel’s constitutionally deficient advice not to accept a favorable plea offer allows 
a defendant to challenge his conviction at trial); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 
(2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
prohibits imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a minor for a 
nonhomicide crime). 
48 See, e.g., PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 442–62 (discussing the felonies at common 
law). 
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Moreover, each of those offenses mirrored the moral code in England
49
 and, 
later, in the colonies;
50
 this moral code was called by some “the rules of 
natural justice,”51 which would have been known to all.  The result was that 
an offense against a neighbor or the king already was a crime against God.  
As John Salmond put it: “The common law is in great part nothing more 
than common honesty and common sense.  Therefore although a man may 
be ignorant that he is breaking the law, he knows very well in most cases 
that he is breaking the rule of right.”52  For that reason, “[i]f not to his 
knowledge lawless, he is at least dishonest and unjust.  He has little ground 
of complaint, therefore, if the law refuses to recognise his ignorance as an 
excuse, and deals with him according to his moral deserts.”53  Lastly, even 
if mores and ethics did not alert someone to forbidden conduct, a reasonable 
person would avoid committing a “mischievous” act as a matter of common 
sense.
54
  Accordingly, being charged with one of the few crimes then 
known would have surprised no offender. 
The offenses found in federal law today reach far beyond what 
common sense and generally accepted moral principles would forbid.  
There is an ever-increasing number of crimes that are outside the category 
of inherently harmful or blameworthy acts—what criminal law treatises call 
malum in se offenses—but are crimes only because the legislature has 
banned that conduct by using the criminal law to regulate public behavior, 
crimes known as malum prohibitum offenses.
55
  Such crimes, originally 
called “public welfare offenses,” originated in the nineteenth century with 
the sale of impure or adulterated food and alcohol, but grew in number early 
in the twentieth century to include building code and traffic violations as 
well.
56
  Today, in order to keep pace with the growth in size and complexity 
 
49 See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 125 (“[T]he fact that crimes are also generally sins is 
one of the practical justifications for requiring a man to know the criminal law.”); LAFAVE, 
supra note 11, § 1.3(f); Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 
8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 644 (1940) (“[T]he early criminal law appears to have been well 
integrated with the mores of the time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.’”). 
50 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 31–58. 
51 SALMOND, supra note 11, at 426–27. 
52 Id. at 427. 
53 Id. 
54 AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 485. 
55 See LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 1.6(b) (defining those terms).  Jerome Hall phrases this 
concern in a slightly different manner.  He distinguishes between actions that are inherently 
immoral and ones that are immoral only because they are forbidden.  Hall, supra note 9, at 
35–36.  The point is the same, however it is described. 
56 See Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590, 595 (1958) (“For it was in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century that the great chain of regulatory statutes was 
initiated in England, which inaugurated a new era in the administration of the criminal law.  
Among them are the Food and Drugs Acts, the Licensing Acts, the Merchandise Marks Acts, 
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  What would have been at most a 
nuisance at common law now may be a crime that can be prosecuted under 
 
the Weights and Measures Acts, the Public Health Acts and the Road Traffic Acts.  With 
these statutes came a judicial readiness to abandon traditional concepts of mens rea and to 
base criminal liability on the doing of an act, or even upon the vicarious responsibility for 
another’s act, in the absence of intent, recklessness or even negligence.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Francis Bowles Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 63–67 
(1933). 
57 See, e.g., Sanford Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in the 
Enforcement of Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (1963); Gerald E. 
Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 23, 37 (1997) (“Legislatures, concerned about the perceived weakness of 
administrative regimes, have put criminal sanctions behind administrative regulations 
governing everything from interstate trucking to the distribution of food stamps to the 
regulation of the environment.” (footnote omitted)). 
58 For a discussion of the history of federal environmental regulation, see RICHARD J. 
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004); PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. 
STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1994); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (5th ed. 2006).  
Congress enacted a few federal laws prior to 1970 that had a limited effect of 
protecting the environment.  Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 
1899, also known as the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006), was primarily designed as a 
means of protecting navigation and commerce, but that law made it a misdemeanor to 
jettison garbage or other material, such as petroleum products and industrial solid wastes, 
into navigable waters.  See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229–30 (1966); 
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 489–92 (1960).  As such, the federal 
government used the Refuse Act early on to prosecute polluters of the nation’s waters.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Penn. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973); United States v. White 
Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1974). 
Environmental law has principally come into being in the last forty years.  The first 
modern-day substantive environmental protection laws were the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C. (2006)), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. (2006)), and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795.  
Congress amended those statutes over time in order to strengthen their effectiveness.  As to 
the Clean Air Act, see the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 
685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)); and the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).  As to the Clean Water Act, see the Clean Water Act of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281(a), 1294–97 
(2006)); and the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1267–1377 (2006)).  As to RCRA, see The Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 6901–91 (2006)).  Congress also passed several other laws, such as the Ocean 
Dumping Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431–47, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–45, 2802–05 (2006)); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
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a variety of federal criminal environmental laws.
59
  Most federal 
environmental statutes also impose recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements that can serve as the basis for a criminal charge.
60
  Some 
statutes even provide criminal sanctions for negligent acts.
61
  In sum, the 
environmental laws offer a full-service panoply of rules of conduct 
enforceable in a criminal prosecution. 
 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611–12, 4661–62, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2006)), 
which Congress amended in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 
10, 26, 42 U.S.C. (2006)); the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2006)); the Pollution 
Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, tit. 2, 104 Stat. 2962; the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–97 (2006), the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300f–j-25 (2006); the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136 (2006); the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001–50 (2006); Underground Storage Tank Compliance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6991j–m 
(2006); and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (2006).  The result is this: 
The 21st edition of THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 
2011), a collection and discussion of all federal environmental laws, is more than 1,000 
pages in length, nearly twice as long as the 12th edition of that text, which was published in 
1993, and many of the provisions discussed in that text can underlie a criminal charge.  See 
Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the 
Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 869 & n.3 (1994) 
[hereinafter Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection]. 
59 For the history of the federal government’s environmental criminal program, see 
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 58, at 962–63; Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental 
Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781, 792–93 (1991); F. Henry Habicht, 
II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the 
Civil Side, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,478, 10,478–80 (1987); Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times 
at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that 
Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 902–12 (1991); Judson W. Starr, Countering 
Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379, 380–84 (1986); and James M. 
Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 916, 917–22 (1991); see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 96–
127.  For an insider’s guide to the investigation of environmental crime, see STEVEN C. 
DRIELAK, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME (1998). 
60 PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 58, at 962; Habicht, supra note 59, at 10,478.  The most 
prominent federal law used to prosecute false statements is 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which makes it 
a crime to make a materially false statement on a matter “within the jurisdiction of” a federal 
agency.  Unlike the laws outlawing perjury, the false statement statute does not require a 
party to be sworn.  See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING 161 (2006).  The 
federal environmental laws can impose additional penalties.  Under the Blockburger test, 
Congress can impose multiple sentences under different laws for the same conduct as long as 
each statute requires proof of a fact that the others do not.  See Blockburger v. United States, 
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also, e.g., Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 
(1996); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164–66 (1977). 
61 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 58, at 962. 
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If the structure and procedures of the contemporary criminal justice 
system, as well as current substantive criminal law, no longer resemble the 
common law, we should ask whether the ancient ignorance or mistake of 
law rule still makes sense.  To remain vibrant, the law should be subject to 
change as knowledge increases, wisdom accrues, experience teaches, and 
customs develop.  The common law rule that a mistake of law is no defense 
is very old, indeed, but longevity alone should not be a sufficient 
justification for its continued use.  Justice Holmes, to pick one example 
from the raft of common law authorities, would agree.  In his article The 
Path of the Law, Holmes wrote: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in 
the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 




This Article asks whether, in light of the manifold changes that have 
occurred to the criminal justice system over several centuries, it still makes 
sense to give effect to the common law rule that, generally speaking, 
ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense.
63
  Given the rule’s longevity, it 
is incumbent on any critic to carry the burden of persuasion regarding why 
the rule should be jettisoned.  To meet that task, we must examine the pros 
and cons of the rule.  The starting point should be the justifications for the 
rule, to which we now turn. 
 
62 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
63 Currently, ignorance or mistake of law plays only a limited role as a defense to 
criminal liability.  Ignorance or mistake of law can be a defense if the statute requires or 
demands proof that the defendant knew he was breaking the law.  For example, a 
defendant’s good-faith belief that he owned the property he took would defeat a larceny 
charge.  See State v. Brown, 16 S.W. 406, 407–08 (Mo. 1891).  A mistake of law defense 
also can be raised in the case of certain complex regulatory schemes where it is unreasonable 
to conclude that Congress intended to penalize a person’s good-faith belief that his conduct 
is lawful.  See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1991) (federal tax code); 
United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 826–29 (9th Cir. 1976) (export control 
laws).  In some circumstances, ignorance of a fact may be a defense, even if ignorance of 
law cannot.  See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994); 1 AUSTIN, supra 
note 11, at 481; Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 
107, 109 & n.10.  Some have treated “ignorance” as a lack of knowledge and a “mistake” as 
a failure of reasoning, see Hall, supra note 9, at 2 & n.5; Keedy, supra note 9, at 76, but the 
distinction is too fine to matter for this purpose. 
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II. THE COMMON LAW RULE THAT IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW IS NO 
EXCUSE 
A. THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE 
Several rationales have been offered in defense of the ignorance or 
mistake rule.
64
  Close examination shows that reflexive application of the 
common law rule can be unjust and irrational in many criminal cases 
brought today. 
1. Everyone Knows the Criminal Law 
The first and oldest justification is that ignorance or mistake of the law 
cannot be an excuse since every person is presumed to know the law.
65
   
The rationale for the presumption is that people generally know what the 
law forbids in whatever jurisdiction they live.  Even if they do not, the 
knowledge is easy to acquire, so anyone who does not learn what is 
outlawed is, at least, guilty of negligence.
66
  That presumption has the virtue 
of being simple and straightforward, and it was reasonable in Blackstone’s 
days, when the penal code was small and reflected community mores.  The 
problem is that this principle is no longer a sensible one, at least not when 
considered as an across-the-board rule. 
Over time, the justification for the ignorance-of-the-law rule began to 
wear thin.  Victorian-era judge and legal historian Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen described the presumption of knowledge of the law as resembling 
“a forged release to a forged bond.”67  As the late-nineteenth-century jurist 
John Austin wrote, even then the proposition “that any actual system is so 
knowable, or that any actual system has ever been so knowable,” in his 
colorful words, is “notoriously and ridiculously false.”68  In this century, 
Jerome Hall described the rule as “an obvious fiction.”69  Other critics 
concluded that “even though the ignorance rule may have been justified in 
the early days of the criminal law in England,” over time that presumption 
 
64 See generally Cass, supra note 10, at 689–95. 
65 Id. at 691. 
66 E.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (stating the rule that ignorance 
of the law is no defense is “[b]ased on the notion that the law is definite and knowable”); 1 
AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 480–81 (“Ignorance or error with regard to matter of fact, is often 
inevitable: That is to say, no attention or advertence could prevent it.  But ignorance or error 
with regard to the state of the law, is never inevitable.  For the law is definite and knowable, 
or might or ought to be so.”); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *27; SALMOND, supra note 
11, at 426; Hall, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
67 2 STEPHEN, supra note 11, at 95. 
68 1 AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 481–82. 
69 Hall, supra note 2, at 14; see also People v. O’Brien, 31 P. 45, 47 (Cal. 1892). 
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has become “indefensible as a statement of fact.”70  Edwin Keedy was even 
less kind; he called the presumption “absurd.”71 
It is easy to see why.  The first federal criminal statute created approxi-
mately thirty offenses.
72
  Today, the federal and state penal codes are 
immense in size.
73
  There are more than 4,000 federal criminal statutes 
alone spread out across the fifty-one titles and 27,000 pages of federal 
law—so many, in fact, that no one, not even the Justice Department, knows 
the actual number of federal criminal offenses.
74
  This growth has been 
particularly large in the field of “regulatory crimes”—that is, offenses that 
consist in violation of a regulatory scheme governing the environment, 
commerce, finance, or health and safety.
75
  And if you include federal 
 
70 Hall & Seligman, supra note 49, at 646. 
71 Keedy, supra note 9, at 77. 
72 “The first Congress enacted laws punishing treason, misprision of treason, perjury in 
federal court, bribery of federal judges, forgery of federal certificates and securities, and 
murder, robbery, larceny and receipt of stolen property on federal property or on the high 
seas.”  George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High Crimes: 
Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commerical Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1417, 1419–20 (2007) (footnotes omitted); see An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).  That number increased over time as 
American society began to recognize that only the federal government could regulate 
interstate commerce, and as the Supreme Court expanded Congress’s power in this regard.  
See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 354–55 (1903) (upholding federal statute 
prohibiting the mails from being used for the purpose of promoting a lottery); FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 24, at 264–65. 
73 For example, the Illinois penal code grew between 1961 and 2001 from 72 pages to 
1,200 pages.  John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, Criminal Code Tough to Crack: Struggle 
to Revamp Illinois Laws Offers Glimpse of What Congress Faces in Its Effort, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 29, 2011, at A3. 
74 See id.; JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM, REVISITING THE 
EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES (June 16, 2008), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf; Paul Rosenzweig, The History of 
Criminal Law, in ONE NATION, UNDER ARREST 127, 131 (Paul Rosenzweig & Brian W. 
Walsh eds., 2010); Terwilliger, supra note 72, at 1418.  That problem only gets worse when 
a prosecutor “digs into ancient books to exhume and enforce long-forgotten statutes.”  Hall, 
supra note 2, at 35 (footnote omitted). 
75 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 282–83 (“There have always been regulatory crimes, 
from the colonial period onward . . . .  But the vast expansion of the regulatory state in the 
twentieth century meant a vast expansion of regulatory crimes as well.  Each statute on 
health and safety, on conservation, on finance, on environmental protection, carried with it 
some form of criminal sanction for violation . . . .  Wholesale extinction may be going on in 
the animal kingdom, but it does not seem to be much of a problem among regulatory laws.  
These now exist in staggering numbers, at all levels.  They are as grains of sand on the 
beach.”). 
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regulations that can be enforced in criminal prosecutions, the number of 
potentially relevant federal laws may exceed 300,000.
76
 
The federal criminal law also is not limited to crimes that mirror any 
readily recognizable moral code.
77
  No criminal code that outlaws the 
unauthorized use of Smokey the Bear’s image or the slogan “Give a Hoot, 
Don’t Pollute” can credibly claim to exclude trivial conduct wholly 
unrelated to moral delinquency.
78
  Other equally nefarious crimes are the 
failure to keep a pet on a leash that does not exceed six feet in length;
79
 
digging or leveling the ground at a campsite;
80
 picnicking in a non-
designated area;
81
 operating a “motorized toy, or an audio device, such as a 
radio, television set, tape deck or musical instrument, in a manner . . . [t]hat 
exceeds a noise level of 60 decibels measured on the A-weighted scale at 50 
feet” (whatever that means);82 “[b]athing, or washing food, clothing, dishes, 
or other property at public water outlets, fixtures or pools” not designated 
for that purpose;
83
 “[a]llowing horses or pack animals to proceed in excess 
of a slow walk when passing in the immediate vicinity of persons on foot or 
bicycle”;84 operating a snowmobile that makes “excessive noise”;85 using 
roller skates, skateboards, roller skis, coasting vehicles, or similar devices 
in non-designated areas;
86
 failing to turn in found property to the park 
 
76 Edwin Meese, III, Introduction to ONE NATION, UNDER ARREST, supra note 74, at xv–
xvi, 218.  
77 Meese, supra note 76, at xviii; Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-
Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and 
Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2007). 
78 Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are 
Ensnared, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1; see also Sayre, supra note 56, at 67. 
79 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.15(a)(2) (2011). 
80 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.10(b)(1). 
81 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.11. 
82 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.12(a)(1). 
83 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.14(a)(5). 
84 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.16(e). 
85 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.18(d)(1).  The term “excessive noise” is helpfully defined as 
follows: 
Excessive noise for snowmobiles manufactured after July 1, 1975 is a level of total snowmobile 
noise that exceeds 78 decibels measured on the A-weighted scale measured at 50 feet.  
Snowmobiles manufactured between July 1, 1973 and July 1, 1975 shall not register more than 
82 decibels on the A-weighted scale at 50 feet.  Snowmobiles manufactured prior to July 1, 1973 
shall not register more than 86 decibels on the A-weighted scale at 50 feet.  All decibel 
measurements shall be based on snowmobile operation at or near full throttle. 
Id. 
86 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.20. 
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Historically, this growth in the criminal law was not a major public 
policy problem because of the scienter or mens rea element in the criminal 
law.  The common law placed great emphasis on the requirement that a 
person could be found guilty only if he acted with a “vicious will.”89  Given 
that requirement, the common law courts found it unnecessary to require 
that a defendant be shown to have acted with the purpose of intentionally 
breaking a known law.
90
  Congress, through the scienter element, in effect 
required the government to prove that a person knew that he committed acts 
that were wrongful, harmful, or illegal.  A mens rea requirement was 
deemed essential to the criminal law—and therefore to freedom—because it 
did not punish reasonable mistakes honestly made
91
 or actions that were 
negligent or accidental.
92
  It distinguished between innocent and guilty 
parties by requiring the state to prove that an offender was blameworthy. 
To be sure, there were exceptions to the mens rea requirement.  What 
were known as “public welfare offenses” are the best example.  That 
narrow exception was limited to violations of housing, sanitary, motor 
vehicles codes, and the like.  Also, public welfare offenses imposed only 
light monetary fines and did not single out anyone for public obloquy.
93
  
Indeed, some courts noted that imprisonment was incompatible with the 
reduced scienter element for such offenses.
94
  Public welfare offenses, like 
malum prohibitum crimes, truly were a small-scale exception to the 
proposition that the criminal justice system should not condemn someone 
 
87 See 36 C.F.R. § 2.22(a)(3). 
88 See 36 C.F.R. § 3.17(b). 
89 Roscoe Pound made this point well: “Historically, our substantive criminal law is 
based upon the theory of punishing the vicious will.  It postulates a free agent confronted 
with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.”  
Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWLES SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927); 
see also HOLMES, supra note 11, at 47. 
90 As Professor Cass has explained, 
At common law, the mens rea necessary to convict generally required that the government show 
the defendant to have acted purposefully to bring about a harm, to have known facts indicating 
that the harm would be a likely result of his action, or to have acted without concern for whether 
the harm would follow. 
Cass, supra note 10, at 683 (footnote omitted). 
91 Id.  For example, a person who mistakenly took someone else’s umbrella would not 
have committed theft because he did not realize that the umbrella was not his. 
92 Which gave rise to Holmes’s famous quip that “even a dog distinguishes between 
being stumbled over and being kicked.”  HOLMES, supra note 11, at 5. 
93 See Sayre, supra note 56, at 58–59, 67, 72, 78–82. 
94 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 617 (1994) (collecting authorities); 
People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 477 (N.Y. 1918). 
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who neither intended to break the law nor knowingly engaged in obviously 
harmful conduct. 
That is no longer true.
95
  Today, Congress oftentimes creates felony 
offenses that do not require proof of Blackstone’s “vicious will.”96  These 
offenses authorize imprisonment and carry the same moral condemnation as 
common law crimes.
97
  Some such laws require only proof of negligence, 
while some establish strict liability offenses.
98
  That development is a 
dramatic change from Blackstone’s day. 
An additional problem stems from the growth of the administrative 
state.  Laws delegating to federal administrative agencies the power to flesh 
out a statutory scheme often have included power to define the terms of 
criminal offenses.  That practice is defended on the ground that 
administrative expertise is needed to ensure that the public is adequately 
protected against whatever schemes an offender can devise.  But pursuing 
that tack creates its own problems.  Not every regulatory scheme can be 
readily used as the basis for a criminal prosecution.  Some public welfare 
laws have an expansive reach and delegate broad authority to officials to 
craft a detailed regulatory scheme using changing, newly available 
scientific data.  The promulgation of implementing regulations can lead to 
 
95 See Gerald E. Lynch, supra note 57, at 38–39 (“[T]he more dominant and longer-
standing trend in our century has been the erosion of mens rea requirements.  This period has 
seen the dramatic growth of strict liability offenses (and their close cousin, liability for 
negligence) in American criminal law, and such offenses have found a particular home in the 
kind of regulatory criminal statutes that have the greatest impact in corporate settings.”). 
96 See, e.g., BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE 
CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW (Apr. 2010), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/WithoutIntent_lo-res.pdf. 
97 STUNTZ, supra note 26, at 32; Rosenzweig, supra note 74, at 138–50; see, e.g., United 
States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United States v. Freed, 401 
U.S. 601 (1971). 
98 Consider the case of United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1101 (2000).  See Rosenzweig, supra note 74, at 127–28, 145–48.  Edward 
Hanousek, Jr. was an employee of the Pacific & Arctic Railway and Navigation Company 
working as the roadmaster of the White Pass & Yukon Railroad.  Hanousek supervised a 
rock quarry project at a site on an embankment 200 feet above the Skagway River in Alaska.  
One day during rock removal operations—while Hanousek was off duty and at home—a 
backhoe operator, employed by an independent contractor retained before Hanousek was 
hired, accidentally struck a petroleum pipeline near the railroad tracks.  The operator’s error 
ruptured the pipeline and spilled 1,000 to 5,000 gallons of oil into the river.  Hanousek was 
convicted under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (2006), for negligently 
discharging oil into a navigable water of the United States.  The district court and court of 
appeals rejected his argument that the Due Process Clause prohibited him from being 
convicted only for negligence. 
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an avalanche of positive criminal laws in one form or another.
99
  That 
approach may serve well the needs of officials tasked with filling in the 
blanks of a regulatory program, but it ill serves the interests of regulated 
parties, who need clearly understandable rules defining criminal liability in 
order to avoid winding up in the hoosegow.  Worse still is the prospect that 
the government has interpreted its regulations in nonpublic guidance 
documents that, in effect, create “secret law.”100 
The environmental laws are an example of that predicament.  The 
marriage of the environmental and criminal laws raises concerns not present 
in the case of common law or, to use the vernacular, contemporary street 
crimes.   
The criminal laws historically have focused on actual or likely 
immediate physical or monetary injury to a particular individual.  The facts 
of the crimes themselves are readily understandable and provable in court.  
Anyone can easily comprehend the significance of the image of a person, 
smoking gun in hand, standing over the dead body of a longtime enemy or 
rival, shouting out, “He deserved it!”  The prosecution can present that 
scenario to a jury in a manner that leaves no doubt what happened, how it 
happened, to whom, by whom, and why.   
 
99 The Environmental Protection Agency has been a particularly fruitful source of 
regulations.  “Since its inception in 1970, the [EPA] has grown to enforce some 25,000 
pages of federal regulations, equivalent to about 15% of the entire body of federal rules.  
Many of the EPA rules carry potential criminal penalties.”  Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 
78.  There are numerous other statutes aside from the environmental laws that authorize 
federal agencies to issue regulations that can be used in a criminal prosecution.  See, e.g., 
National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2006); Arms Export Control Act, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 2751–99aa-2 (2006); Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 
1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6701–71 (2006); Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C.  
§§ 2401–20 (2006). 
100 The complexity of environmental statutes and regulations is well known, but their 
obscurity may not be fully understood.  A significant problem in this area is that the 
government’s interpretation of regulations is often issued in “guidance documents” that may 
not be generally available.  No one seems to know (or even to have investigated) the number 
of memoranda reflecting a federal agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, even 
though that interpretation is generally considered controlling.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243, 255–58 (2006); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997); Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1945); cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 
U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (collecting cases and holding that the same rule applies to the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines).  The result is that 
critics of environmental law complain that the government may rely on “secret” or 
“underground” law as a basis for claiming a violation.  Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental 
Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 
TULANE L. REV. 487, 503 (1996).  The Internet allows such documents to be posted for 
public viewing; that may ameliorate the problem, but is unlikely to make the problem go 
away. 
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But the same cannot be said of the environmental laws.  They 
primarily seek to reduce the potential, long-term risk of injury to human 
health and the environment generally, not just to a specified person or 
persons.  The scientific evidence necessary to establish the likelihood and 
type of harm can be a matter of estimate, judgment, and dispute even 
among experts.  To empower regulators to reduce such potential, evolving 
risks, the environmental laws use broad, aspirational, complex, and 
dynamic standards in order to enable regulators to capture all possible 
harms.  Unlike the criminal laws, which require that forbidden conduct be 
defined with certainty, the environmental laws intentionally leave regulators 
ample room to maneuver in case new evidence amplifies the known 
potential adverse effect of hazardous substances (e.g., carcinogens) or 
brings to light new harms.
101
 
Moreover, the environmental laws often do not require proof of the 
same type of mental state and actions that ordinary crimes demand.
102
  
Some criminal environmental laws require proof of the same “evil 
meaning” mind demanded by common law crimes.103  But most can lead to 
a conviction if a person knew what he was doing, even if he did not know 
that what he was doing was illegal or wrongful,
104
 and sometimes even if he 
merely acted negligently.
105
  Moreover, the “knowledge” necessary to 
establish a violation can be imputed to a person from the knowledge of 
 
101 See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO L.J. 2407 (1995); 
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 881–84. 
102 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 80 (“Criminal provisions in 
environmental law challenge traditional notions of criminal conduct.”). 
103 Id. at 97; see Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (2006); Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1)-(2) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)(2) (2006). 
104 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME 25 (2008); Lazarus, Assimilating 
Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 881; see, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 
658, 667–68 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715–16 (8th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537–41 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 
35 F.3d 1275, 1284 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 
F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991). 
105 See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2006); Clean Air Act of 
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2006); United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1282–83 (10th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
conviction for negligence); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 
1979) (same); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 97.  One law, the Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, also known as the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 
(2006), makes it a strict liability misdemeanor to discharge garbage into navigable waters of 
the United States.  See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 623 (1st Cir. 
1974); BRICKEY, supra note 100, at 58–59. 
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others in his company.
106
  As far as the necessary criminal acts go, a person 
can be held liable not only for his own actions, but also for the conduct of 
others under his supervision because of his position in the company.
107
  In 
some instances, a person can be held criminally liable for not reporting a 
crime.
108
  Finally, “[i]gnorance or mistake-of-law are generally not valid 
defenses, except perhaps for a specific intent crime that requires a knowing 
violation.”109 
Atop that, some amount of pollution and waste is inevitable in a 
modern industrial society.
110
  There is no realistic possibility of eliminating 
 
106 The courts have permitted that imputation of knowledge pursuant to what is known as 
the “collective knowledge” doctrine, under which a corporation’s knowledge is the sum of 
what all its employees know when acting within the scope of their responsibilities.  United 
States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987); BRICKEY, supra note 100, 
at 49–50; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 97. 
107 United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding 
that the jury may infer knowledge of the lack of a permit “to those individuals who hold the 
requisite responsible positions with the corporate defendant”); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 97 (“For management, culpability is largely a measure of 
whether they actively participated in or countenanced the environmental misconduct.”); cf. 
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 677–78 (1975) (explaining that juries may infer 
corporate officers are aware of the facts constituting a crime without proof that they 
subjectively knew the facts).  Some courts, however, have imposed a stricter proof 
requirement on the government.  See United States v. McDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 
933 F.2d 35, 55 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[K]nowledge may be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence, including position and responsibility of defendants such as corporate officers, as 
well as information provided to those defendants on prior occasions.  Further, willful 
blindness to the facts constituting the offense may be sufficient to establish knowledge.  
However, the district court erred by instructing the jury that proof that a defendant was a 
responsible corporate officer, as described, would suffice to conclusively establish the 
element of knowledge expressly required under [42 U.S.C.] § 3008(d)(1).  Simply because a 
responsible corporate officer believed that on a prior occasion illegal transportation occurred, 
he did not necessarily possess knowledge of the violation charged.  In a crime having 
knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility under 
Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of 
knowledge.”). 
108 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (2006); McDonald, 933 F.2d at 55 (“CERCLA 
imposes criminal sanctions upon any person in charge of a facility from which a ‘reportable 
quantity’ of a hazardous substance is released who fails to immediately notify the 
appropriate federal agency.”). 
109
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 102 (footnote omitted).  An 
additional problem in the criminal environmental area is that there are more political 
controversies and interbranch feuding than in other areas of the federal criminal law.  See 
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 872–79.  
110 See Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 882; 
Terwilliger, supra note 72, at 1418 (“Environmental laws for instance, incorporate steep 
criminal penalties for failing to meet regulatory standards in conducting what is otherwise 
legitimate commercial activity.  Polluting is legal in the United States; the government issues 
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all risk of harm from some activities.  Even breathing releases carbon 
dioxide into the environment.  The question, therefore, is not how we can 
eliminate pollution entirely, but how we should manage known and 
unknown risks from the known, inevitable consequences of running a 
modern economy.
111
  The difficulty of making those fine judgments 
reinforces the need for a scienter standard focusing on blameworthiness, 
but, unfortunately, few federal criminal environmental laws require proof 
that someone intended to break the law.
112
  The result is that criminal laws 
designed to deal with common law crimes are blunt instruments not easily 




permits to allow it.  Polluting too much, however, can be a felony.  Some acts of pollution 
may indeed be criminal because they involve volitional and intentional acts that can result in 
foreseeable and significant harm—dumping highly toxic materials in an open field or 
waterway, for example.  But the more common subject matter of environmental ‘crimes’ 
involves the line between permitted and not permitted discharges, which can be razor thin, 
often expressed in parts per million, and the stuff of great debate between experts and 
scientists.”). 
111 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE 3–29 (1993). 
112
What makes such an approach to mens rea particularly problematic in the environmental law 
context is that environmental standards, unlike most traditional crimes, present questions of 
degree rather than of kind.  Murder, burglary, assault, and embezzlement are simply unlawful.  
There is no threshold level below which such conduct is acceptable.  In contrast, pollution is not 
unlawful per se: In many circumstances, some pollution is acceptable.  It is only pollution that 
exceeds certain prescribed levels that is unlawful.  But, for that very reason, the mens rea 
element should arguably be a more, not less, critical element in the prosecution of an 
environmental offense. 
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 882; see also Terwilliger, 
supra note 72, at 1419 (“Problems caused by such explosive growth in federal regulatory 
prosecutions, especially in the criminalization of what in the past would have been viewed as 
purely civil or administrative matters, have been exacerbated by the various legal doctrines 
that have made it far easier to prosecute corporations.  These include the respondeat superior 
doctrine and vicarious corporate liability, the collective knowledge doctrine, and the general 
lessening of the intent standard in many of the crimes involved.  Where ‘intent’ simply 
means ‘knowing conduct,’ and where a corporation is held to know everything any of its 
employees knows and is held responsible for the actions of every employee, it is easy to 
understand why corporate prosecutions proliferate.”). 
113 Professor Richard Lazarus has argued that the markedly different goals and designs of 
the environmental and criminal laws make their integration an enormously difficult 
challenge.  See Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 883–84; 
Lazarus, supra note 101, at 2466–67; see also Brickey, supra note 100, at 497–504.  In his 
words: 
[T]here is a danger, indeed a potential impropriety, in Congress’s approach to environmental 
criminal liability.  The question whether certain conduct warrants a criminal sanction is far 
different than whether a civil sanction may be warranted, precisely because the latter is 
susceptible to being no more than an economic disincentive.  Criminal liability standards should 
be more settled and less dynamic.  They should be more reflective of what in fact can be 
accomplished rather than of the public’s aspirations of how, if pushed, the world can change in 
the future. 
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The result is that, for some activities, federal criminal law has become 
a monstrously large and complex trap.  In the words of the late Professor 
William Stuntz, American criminal law today “covers far more conduct 
than any jurisdiction could possibly punish.”114  Worse still than the fact 
that the federal criminal code is generally unruly and incoherent is the fact 
that the penal code no longer can be said to give the average person notice 
of what the law prohibits.  Blameworthiness used to serve as a criterion that 
distinguished those who were evil-minded from those who were morally 
innocent, or just negligent.  But we no longer can rely on the legislature to 
draw that line.  We are gradually heading toward the prospect that 
everything not expressly permitted is forbidden, as was said of the former 
Soviet Union.
115
  If so, everyone can be charged with some crime regardless 
 
 Perhaps most importantly, criminal sanctions should also be tempered by the gravity of the 
decision that certain conduct warrants the most severe of sanctions.  Criminal sanctions are not 
simply another enforcement tool in the regulator’s arsenal to promote public policy objectives.  
A criminal sanction is fundamentally different in character.  The reason why criminal sanctions 
have greater deterrent value is also the reason why they must be used more selectively.  Criminal 
sanctions should be reserved for the more culpable subset of offenses and not used solely for 
their ability to deter. 
 To date, Congress, however, has made no meaningful or systematic effort to consider criminal 
sanctions as presenting an issue distinct from that presented by civil sanctions.  Congress has not 
tried to identify those circumstances in which the culpability of conduct warrants taking the next 
step of imposing criminal sanctions.  Congress has not tried to identify those kinds of 
environmental standards for which criminal sanctions are more appropriate.  Nor has Congress 
focused as carefully as it should on the mens rea issue. 
Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection, supra note 58, at 883–84 (footnote 
omitted). 
114 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
507 (2001); see generally Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005) (discussing the vast number and breadth of federal criminal 
laws).  Both parties are to blame for the problem of overcriminalization.  See Kevin 
McKenzie, Law Professor Slams Expansion of Federal Crimes, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Oct. 
25, 2011, 11:21 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/oct/25/law-professor-
slams-expansion-federal-crimes/ (“[Law professor John S.] Baker blamed Republicans as 
well as Democrats for the trend, saying that both parties fuel it.  One-third of about 4,200 
federal crimes on the books have been passed since 1970 and Republican President Richard 
Nixon’s ‘war on crime.’”).  The problem may be most acute during election years.  See 
Thornburgh, supra note 77, at 1282 (“A significant aspect of this increase in federal crimes 
over the past ten years, incidentally, is the wholly unsurprising fact that a disproportionate 
number of these criminal laws were passed in three election years, 1998, 2000, and 2002.  
The ‘jail-centric’ approach by the Congress, which is fueled by the almost reflexive notion 
that being ‘tough on crime’ is good fodder on the campaign trail while trolling for votes, has 
deep societal costs that are especially poignant in the regulatory and business arenas.”). 
115 For those who may find that statement overblown consider the following list of 
“crimes” and “criminals”: (1) Abner Schoenwetter spent sixty-nine months in federal prison 
for importing marginally small lobsters and for bulk packing them in plastic, rather than bin 
boxes, in violation of Honduran law, which is made applicable to U.S. citizens by virtue of 
the Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 
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of the effort that he or she makes to learn where the line is drawn and to 
stay far away from it.  Pushing the presumption of knowledge of the law to 
reach every nook and cranny of today’s penal code would lead to an 
unsound and irrational result.  Those developments in the criminal law 





(2006)); (2) the federal government charged retired race-car champion Bobby Unser for 
accidentally driving a snowmobile in a blizzard onto federal land where such devices are not 
allowed; (3) the federal government charged Robert Kern for moose hunting in Russia in 
violation of Russian law, as incorporated by the Lacey Act; (4) the federal government 
charged Eddie Anderson and his son with attempting to take arrowheads from a campsite 
that, unbeknownst to them, was on federal property; (5) the federal government charged 
George Norris with importing the wrong type of orchids, in violation of a treaty, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, as incorporated by the Lacey Act, 
and of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–34 (2006); (6) the federal 
government charged Robert Eldridge, Jr., with freeing a whale caught in his fishing net, 
rather than reporting the ensnarement to federal authorities so that they could free the whale 
instead, in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371–1423 
(2006); (7) the federal government charged Lawrence Lewis with diverting a backed-up 
sewage system (clogged by the adult diapers flushed down the toilet by the elderly residents 
at the nursing home where he worked) into the Potomac River, in violation of the Clean 
Water Act, despite his belief that the water was being sent to a sewage treatment plant; (8) 
the federal government charged Wade Martin with selling a sea otter skin to a person who 
turned out to be a non-native Alaskan, in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 
1972; (9) the City of Palo Alto, California, had sixty-one-year-old grandmother Kay 
Liebrand arrested and criminally charged for allowing the bushes on her property to exceed 
two feet in height; and (10) New York City makes it a crime to hail a cab for someone not in 
one’s “social company.”  See Trent England et al., The Overcriminalization Problem, in ONE 
NATION, UNDER ARREST, supra note 74, at 3, 3–11, 23–30, 61–78; Gary Fields & John R. 
Emshwiller, A Sewage Blunder Earns Engineer a Criminal Record, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 
2011, at A1; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act Sets 
an Unusual Standard for Crime, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, at A12; Gary Fields & John R. 
Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
27, 2011, at A1; Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More 
Ensnared, supra note 78, at A1; Michael M. Grynbaum, Under Rule, Hailing a Cab for a 
Stranger Can Be Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, at A14. 
116 Because the ignorance rule is stated as a presumption, it could be argued that the 
presumption cannot be applied where doing so is irrational.  On occasion, the Supreme Court 
has held that Congress may not rely on a presumption to serve as proof of an element of an 
offense if the presumed fact is more likely than not to follow the predicate fact.  See Leary v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).  
Application of the Tot and Leary standard to the common law ignorance rule could prove 
unjustified in some cases.  Cass, supra note 10, at 689.  Of course, if Congress can and does 
dispense with the element of proof to which the presumption applies, the rule of Tot and 
Leary becomes of dubious utility.  Packer, supra note 63, at 121 n.51.  That is the case here.  
The presumption is irrebuttable, and therefore is the same as a rule of law foreclosing a 
mistake of law defense.  Jellico Coal Mine Co. v. Commonwealth, 29 S.W. 26, 26–27 (Ky. 
1895); SALMOND, supra note 11, at 426; see 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2492 (2d ed. 1923). 
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2. The Ignorance Rule Is Necessary to Enforce the Law 
The second justification for the ignorance-is-no-excuse rule is 
expediency.  A contrary rule, the argument goes, would place on the 
prosecution the inordinately difficult burden of showing what knowledge of 
the law a person had at the time of the charged offense.
117
  In Austin’s 
words, “if ignorance of the law were a ground of exemption, the 
administration of justice would be arrested.”118 
That fear may best explain why the government strenuously defends 
the ignorance rule, and why courts diligently have continued to follow it.
119
  
Ultimately, however, that argument is unpersuasive.  The best—and 
shortest—refutation was given more than a century ago by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in his work The Common Law.
120
  As he explained, the difficulty-
of-proof objection is irrelevant.  “If justice requires the fact to be 
ascertained, the difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try . . . 
unless we are justified in sacrificing individuals to public 
convenience . . . .”121  It also is no argument that permitting this issue to be 
litigated will unduly lengthen criminal trials.  Both the criminal law and the 
Constitution recognize that certain values can trump the state’s interest in 
 
117 E.g., Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 (1833) (explaining that the 
principle that mistake of law is not an excuse “results from the extreme difficulty of 
ascertaining what is, bonâ fide, the interpretation of the party. . . .”); see also People v. 
O’Brien, 31 P. 45, 46–47 (Cal. 1892); AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 483; 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46; see HOLMES, supra note 11, at 41; KENNY, supra note 11, 
at 68 n.5 (suggesting the rationale for the ignorance rule is “not a realisation of ideal justice, 
but an exercise of Society’s right of self-preservation”) (quoting Prof. Henry Sidgwick); 
SALMOND, supra note 11, at 426; 1 WHARTON, supra note 15, at § 399; Hall & Seligman, 
supra note 49, at 646–47; Packer, supra note 63, at 109.  As Holmes explained: 
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law’s indifference to a 
man’s particular temperament, faculties, and so forth.  Public policy sacrifices the individual to 
the general good.  It is desirable that the burden of all should be equal, but it is still more 
desirable to put an end to robbery and murder.  It is no doubt true that there are many cases in 
which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse 
at all would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know 
and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other 
side of the scales. 
HOLMES, supra note 11, at 46. 
118
 AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 483; see also id. (“For, in almost every case, ignorance of 
the law would be alleged.  And, for the purpose of determining the reality and ascertaining 
the cause of the ignorance, the Court were [sic] compelled to enter upon questions of fact, 
insoluble and interminable.”). 
119 Cass, supra note 10, at 689. 
120 See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 45. 
121 Id. at 45 & n.*. 
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efficiency.
122
  Separating the blameless from the blameworthy is a 
sufficiently weighty interest that society should be willing to countenance 
some delays in reaching a verdict.  In any event, the objection is unfounded.  
“[N]ow that parties can testify, it may be doubted whether a man’s 
knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than the many questions 
which are gone into,”123 Holmes noted, and “‘[t]he difficulty, such as it is, 
would be met by throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the law-
breaker.”124 
It also is fair to ask just how big this problem is.  The government 
already faces a version of it in federal criminal tax prosecutions.  The 
government must prove that a defendant “willfully” violated the income tax 
laws,
125
 and a defendant can defend against such a charge by maintaining 
that he did not subjectively intend to break the law or that he mistakenly 
believed that he properly reported his taxable income.
126
  Yet, there is no 
reason to believe that this mistake of law has freed scores of willful tax 
evaders, and there is even less reason to believe that this defense otherwise 
 
122 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–57 (1972) (“The establishment of 
prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest 
worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication.  But the Constitution recognizes higher 
values than speed and efficiency.  Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in 
general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the 
fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and 
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, 
than mediocre ones.  Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than 
individualized determination.  But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to 
past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both 
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.”). 
123 HOLMES, supra note 11, at 45; see, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 473 (1993) 
(“‘The state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.  It is true that it is 
very difficult to prove . . . but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else.’”) 
(quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, (1885) 29 Ch. D. 459, 483); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716–17 (1983). 
124 HOLMES, supra note 11, at 45. 
125 The term “willful” often is used to describe that state of mind necessary for violations 
of the federal tax laws.  See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998); Ratzlaf 
v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 138 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 
(1991); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 
U.S. 346, 360 (1973). 
126 The Cheek case involved just that.  An airline pilot and tax protestor claimed that he 
had a good-faith belief that he was not obliged to file an income tax return because the 
federal tax laws and Sixteenth Amendment could not authorize a federal income tax on 
wages and salaries.  After being convicted of willfully failing to pay his taxes, he argued that 
a subjective good-faith belief is a complete defense to such a charge, even if that belief is not 
objectively reasonable.  The Supreme Court agreed with him.  See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194–
96, 201–07. 
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nullifies the government’s ability to prosecute taxpayers for fraud.  The 
absence of such evidence in the one instance in which a mistake of law 
defense is being litigated today is a strong argument that the defense is not 
likely to scuttle many justified federal criminal prosecutions.
127
 
Is the government’s concern that a defendant will go scot-free by 
claiming that he did not know that it is illegal to murder, rape, rob, burgle, 
steal, cheat, lie, or possess controlled substances?  Doubtful.  Anyone who 
grows up in America today (or enters from elsewhere) is likely to know that 
the criminal law prohibits thievery and homicide.
128
  A defendant who 
claims ignorance of those laws probably should be committed as insane
129
 
(or given an award for having world-class chutzpah).  But the likelihood 
that he will walk out of the courtroom a free man is nil because a jury is 
almost certain to find that defense incredible. 
To be sure, the jury always can refuse to convict someone “in the teeth 
of both law and facts”130 and the government doubtless will offer that 
argument as a reason for refusing to recognize a mistake of law defense.  
But if a defendant snookers the jury into believing that he actually was 
ignorant of the law prohibiting murder, the government has a bigger 
problem than one isolated miscarriage of justice.  The government’s 
problem is with the gullibility of the twelve jurors who decided that case, 
 
127 There are a few other cases involving other complex regulatory schemes a person 
may defend by relying on a good-faith belief that his conduct is lawful.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828–29 (9th Cir. 1976) (export control laws).  
But the criminal tax field remains the largest one in this regard. 
128 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 108–09 (“Perhaps the most primitive and basic 
rules in the criminal justice system were those that protected property rights. . . .  The laws 
against theft, larceny, embezzlement, and fraud are familiar friends.  People may not know 
every technical detail, but they get the general point.  Probably all human communities 
punish theft in one way or another; it is hard to imagine a society that does not have a 
concept of thievery, and some way to punish people who help themselves to things that 
‘belong’ to somebody else.”); see also SALMOND, supra note 11, at 427; Mark D. Yochum, 
The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a 
Little Sex), 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEG. COM. 635, 636 (1999) (“[E]vil is fundamentally known. . . .  
Ignorance that murder is a crime is no excuse for the crime of murder.”). 
129 The historic M’Naghten test of insanity exculpated a defendant suffering from a 
“defect of reason, from a disease of the mind,” if he did not know the nature and quality of 
his actions or, even if he did, did not know that they were wrong.  See M’Naghten’s Case, 
(1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 722.  The Model Penal Code definition of insanity and federal 
law have modified those elements, but still focus on the presence of a mental disease 
depriving a person of the ability to conform to the law’s requirements or to know that his 
actions are wrongful.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–
56 & nn.7–22 (2006) (discussing the development of various forms of the insanity defense).  
A person who claims that he was unaware that theft and murder are illegal effectively is 
raising an insanity defense and should be treated as if he had done so directly. 
130 Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920). 
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and perhaps with the community from which that jury was seated, not with 
a mistake of law defense.  By contrast, if the jury knows that the defendant 
is lying but acquits him anyway, the government’s problem, again, is with 
the jury or the community, not with a mistake of law defense.  In fact, in 
that case the government has a far, far bigger problem than the need to 
refute one spurious defense.  Something that the government has done, 
either in that case or in general, has so alienated the members of the jury or 
community that they have let go a dangerous offender because doing so was 
the only way to send a message of frustration with the operation of the 
criminal justice system or with how the government uses that system in the 
vicinity from which the jurors were drawn.
131
  If a jury vents its frustration 
and rage at the government by letting a guilty offender go free, the 
government should reexamine and remedy its own actions, rather than deny 
innocent defendants the opportunity to present a reasonable mistake of law 
defense. 
A more serious objection is that allowing a mistake of law defense will 
cut deeply into the government’s ability to prosecute white-collar offenders 
for regulatory crimes, such as environmental offenses.
132
  The argument 
goes as follows: Traditionally, judges have been lenient on white-collar 
criminals, in part because society treated such offenses as mere economic 
crimes as to which compliance is only a matter of comparative efficiency—
that is, society wants parties to comply with regulatory laws only when 
doing so is less costly than violating them.
133
  The belief is widespread that 
businessmen would—and should—comply with economic regulations only 
as long as the costs of compliance are less than the potential penalties for 
noncompliance (discounted by the likelihood of detection, prosecution, and 
 
131 See STUNTZ, supra note 26, at 285–86, 386 nn.1–4 (collecting authorities and 
summarizing the debate over jury nullification). 
132 The term “white-collar crime” has been defined various ways in the law and the social 
sciences.  See GREEN, supra note 60, at 9–20; DAVID WEISBURD & ELIN WARING WITH ELLEN 
F. CHAYET, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS 8–18 (2001).  Edwin Sutherland, 
the father of the concept, defined it as crime “committed by a person of respectability and 
high social status in the course of his occupation.”  EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME 7 (1983) (footnote omitted).  By contrast, the FBI (like most people) defines that term 
in its colloquial sense of “lying, cheating, and stealing,” and as being “synonymous with the 
full range of frauds committed by business and government professionals.”  White-Collar 
Crime, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/whitecollarcrime (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2012); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, at 290.  This article will use the 
term in that manner, too. 
133 Edwin Sutherland, the grandfather of white-collar crime theory, believed that society 
mistakenly belittled or overlooked the harmful effects of white-collar crime because of the 
high social status of the offenders.  See generally Edwin H. Sutherland, Is “White Collar 
Crime” Crime?, 10 AMER. SOC. REV. 132 (1945); EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME (1949); EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, ON ANALYZING CRIME (1973). 
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conviction).  Moreover, historically society has not viewed economic or 
regulatory offenses as morally reprehensible.  Until recent examples of 
villainy,
134
 that attitude had been reserved for violent or street crimes.  
White-collar criminals commonly were seen as “upstanding members of the 
community,” quite unlike the ruffians who perpetrate the common law 
crimes of assault, burglary, larceny, theft, and homicide.
135
  Prosecutors and 
judges can sympathize with white-collar criminals because they can see 
themselves in the same position as corporate officers and can understand 
the value system of corporate America.  And insofar as there are 
environmental crimes on the books, the public has held the same attitude 
toward the businessmen who infringe on the environmental laws as it has 
toward the ones who violated the antitrust laws: their conduct is regrettable, 
but not morally blameworthy, and, given the economic imperative to make 
a profit, sometimes even necessary.  The only way to prosecute someone 
successfully for such crimes, the argument would go, is to reduce the 
government’s burden by lowering the mental state necessary for a 
conviction.  Requiring the government to prove willful wrongdoing 




If that is the government’s concern, the government may be right as to 
its assessment of the litigation risk in some (but not all) cases, but wrong as 
to whether the presence of that risk is a persuasive reason to deny a mistake 
of law defense altogether.  The criminal law expresses the community’s 
condemnation of certain conduct as blameworthy,
137
 and that consideration 
always has been an important part of the type of antisocial conduct that we 
label a crime.
138
  Dragging a morally blameless person into the criminal 
 
134 The failure of Enron and the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme come to mind.  See 
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); Nick Carbone, Top 10 Swindlers, TIME 
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2104982_
2104983_2105005,00.html. 
135 See supra note 133. 
136 See, e.g., Michele Kuruck, Comment, Putting Polluters in Jail: The Imposition of 
Criminal Sanctions on Corporate Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 93, 95 (1985). 
137 See George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United 
States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953) (“The essence of punishment for moral delinquency 
lies in the criminal conviction itself.  One may lose more money on the stock market than in 
a court-room; a prisoner of war camp may well provide a harsher environment than a state 
prison; death on the field of battle has the same physical characteristics as death by sentence 
of law.  It is the expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict 
which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.”). 
138 See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 11, at 50 (“It is not intended to deny that criminal 
liability . . . is founded on blameworthiness.  Such a denial would shock the moral sense of 
any civilized community; or, to put it another way, a law which punished conduct which 
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justice system forces him—as well as his family, friends, colleagues, and 
anyone else who cares for him—to endure the series of harms and 
indignities that a modern law enforcement bureaucracy inflicts on every 
suspect, the guilty and innocent alike: being arrested, undergoing a 
thorough probing of one’s person and whatever is worn or carried incident 
to a search following arrest; being handcuffed, driven to the police station 
in the back seat of a patrol car, booked, waiting for hours in a temporary 
holding cell, and doing the “perp walk” before the media; waiting in jail 
until bail is posted (a cost that will never be recouped); paying for a lawyer 
with one’s life savings or child’s college fund; and spending a terribly long 
and painful period awaiting trial while the police and media investigate, and 
sometime publicize, every embarrassing aspect of one’s life.139 
But there is more.  Convicting a morally blameless party also brings 
the criminal justice system into disrepute and dilutes the effect of society’s 
communal condemnation of his actions.  No one treats a parking ticket as 
the mark of Cain because everyone (on multiple occasions) has received 
one.  Regulatory or malum prohibitum crimes certainly are a step up from 
traffic offenses, but the step is not remotely as steep as the one that leads to 
violent crime.  The upshot is that a properly defined and limited mistake of 
law defense can balance the interests of all concerned parties without 
forcing any one interest to be sacrificed for any other. 
The trial procedure for adjudicating a mistake of law defense also can 
be set forth in a manner that does not make a big dent in the system’s need 
to operate efficiently.  For example, as explained below, courts can presume 
that a defendant knows the law and can place on the defendant the burdens 
of raising a mistake of law defense and of producing evidence to 
 
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for 
that community to bear.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 419 (1958); see also, Packer, supra note 63, at 109; Susan L. Pilcher, 
Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence” in the 
Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1995) (“Equally fundamental to our criminal 
justice tradition is the notion that a culpable criminal intent, or mens rea, is generally a moral 
prerequisite to the imposition of punishment.  Criminal punishment in the absence of 
personal blameworthiness is counterintuitive to the average person, and American law 
purports to permit such results only in the face of compelling public health and safety 
interests.”); Sayre, supra note 56, at 72 (“To subject defendants entirely free from moral 
blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the community sense of 
justice . . . .”). 
139 Not to mention that once a person is arrested, law enforcement submits the arrest 
information to the National Crime Information Center, which can be accessed via a patrol 
car computer.  See National Crime Information Center, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ncic (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (explaining function of the NCIC).  The result is that 
every future traffic stop becomes a far less welcome adventure. 
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substantiate that claim.
140
  That approach would avoid the prosecution’s 
need to raise and refute the issue in every case.  Only when a defendant 
raises the issue and marshals sufficient proof that his mistake was 
reasonable would that issue be litigated to the jury.
141
 
3. The Ignorance Rule Promotes Deterrence 
A third, related justification for the rule is that it promotes deterrence 
by encouraging members of the public to make themselves aware of what 
the law prohibits and facilitates enforcement of the criminal law by 
disallowing a defense that otherwise could be widely used.
142
  Moreover, 
the argument goes, the criminal law may further those goals even though 
the rule would lead to some unjust convictions in particular cases of 
defendants who are not blameworthy.  In Holmes’s words: “Public policy 
sacrifices the individual to the general good.”143 
That principle works better as a defense of the constitutionality of the 
mistake rule than as a justification for the rule itself.  That justification does 
not deny that the rule will lead to mistaken and unjust convictions in some 
cases; it takes the position that society legitimately may adopt a rule with 
that effect.  So phrased, that defense is formidable, with a variety of 
supporting battlements.  We do not require the government to prove a 
defendant’s guilt beyond any doubt, only beyond a reasonable doubt.144  We 
 
140 A defendant can be made to bear the burden of production regarding a defense—that 
is, of raising the defense and introducing sufficient proof to make the defense an issue.  See, 
e.g., Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 510 (1983) (collecting cases).  Sometimes a 
defendant must bear the burden of proof, see, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230 (1987); 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 199–200 (1977), but not always, see, e.g., Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975); Keedy, supra note 9, at 86.  Placing on the defendant 
the burden of persuasion also would avoid the risk that a jury would need to acquit if it found 
itself in equipoise whether the defendant intended to break the law.  Further elaboration on 
that subject is beyond the scope of this article. 
141 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–15 (1980) (discussing the defendant’s 
evidentiary burden to properly raise a duress or necessity defense); Keedy, supra note 9, at 
86. 
142 See Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833) (“[I]t results from . . . the 
extreme danger of allowing such excuses to be set up for illegal acts, to the detriment of the 
public.  There is scarcely any law, which does not admit of some ingenious doubt; and there 
would be perpetual temptations to violations of the laws, if men were not put upon extreme 
vigilance to avoid them.”); see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *45, *46; HOLMES, 
supra note 11, at 48–49; see also Hall & Seligman, supra note 49. 
143 HOLMES, supra note 11, at 48; cf. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 
68 (1910) (“‘[I]n a few instances, the public welfare has made it necessary to declare a 
crime, irrespective of the actor’s intent.’  A concession of exceptions would seem to destroy 
the principle.”). 
144 See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 7–22 (1994); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
317 (1979) (“A ‘reasonable doubt,’ at a minimum, is one based on ‘reason.’”); Holt v. 
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do not require the prosecution to make every scientific advance available to 
a defendant to establish his innocence.
145
  We do not bar the government 
from obtaining evidence from the accused—e.g., evidence dealing with an 
alibi or insanity claim—that may be critical to puncturing his defense.146  
We do not require that the courts, rather than the clemency process, always 
be open to review a defendant’s claim that his rights were violated at trial, 
or even that he is innocent.
147
  And we allow the legislature to revise the 
criminal justice system in ways that “have the effect of making it easier for 
the prosecution to obtain convictions.”148  In sum, “[d]ue process does not 
require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate 
the possibility of convicting an innocent person.”149 
But even if the Constitution allows the government to trade off greater 
deterrence for an unknown number of unjust convictions, the question 
remains why the government would want to make that choice when it can 
have the benefits of the former without the costs of the latter.  In other 
 
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 254 (1910) (rejecting argument that “any mere possibility” of 
doubt is sufficient to acquit); Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92 (1907); Dunbar v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 185, 199 (1895) (approving a jury instruction defining “reasonable 
doubt” as requiring that the evidence “must be so strong, as not to exclude all doubt or 
possibility of error, but as to exclude reasonable doubt”); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 439–
40 (1887) (approving a jury instruction stating that “a reasonable doubt is a doubt based on 
reason, and which is reasonable in view of all the evidence” and that “[p]ersons of 
speculative minds may in almost every such case suggest possibilities of the truth being 
different from that established by the most convincing proof” but “the jurors are not to be led 
away by speculative notions as to such possibilities”); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 
312 (1880). 
145 See Dist. Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319 
(2009) (explaining that due process does not require the state to make post-trial DNA testing 
available for a convicted defendant). 
146 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1 (requiring defense on request to provide notice of alibi 
defense); Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2 (requiring defense to provide notice of insanity defense); 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.3 (same, reliance on public authority defense); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 
U.S. 400, 413–16 (1988) (rejecting constitutional challenge to enforcement of defense 
notice-of-alibi requirement by excluding alibi witness for violating rule); Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80–86 (1978) (upholding over constitutional challenge pretrial notice-
of-alibi requirement on defense); cf. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 (1991) (rejecting 
facial challenge to rape-shield statute requiring pretrial hearing on admissibility of 
complainant’s past sexual conduct). 
147 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398–417 (1993); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 
880, 887 (1983) (“Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.”). 
148 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n.5 (1986) (“From the vantage point of 
the Constitution, a change in law favorable to defendants is not necessarily good, nor is an 
innovation favorable to the prosecution necessarily bad.” (quoting John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & 
Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 
YALE L.J. 1325, 1361 (1979))). 
149 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977). 
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words, the problem with this defense of the ignorance or mistake of law 
rule is that it is overbroad.
150
  A properly defined and limited rule better 
serves the interests of public safety and civil rights than the current rule.  
For example, if the conduct at issue is widely followed and if no reasonable 
person would have known what the law proscribed, it is arbitrary to single 
out one person for enforcement of that law.
151
  In fact, it is not clear that 
Holmes—let alone Blackstone—would have disagreed with resort to such a 
properly cabined defense today.  After all, Holmes published The Common 
Law in 1881, long before the advent of the public welfare offenses that first 
began to eliminate a mens rea requirement in the 1920s.
152
  Holmes did not 
 
150 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.17 (1978) (“The 
possibility that those subjected to strict liability will take extraordinary care in their dealings 
is frequently regarded as one advantage of a rule of strict liability,” but “where the conduct 
proscribed is difficult to distinguish from conduct permitted and indeed encouraged, as in the 
antitrust context, the excessive caution spawned by a regime of strict liability will not 
necessarily redound to the public’s benefit.”). 
151 HOLMES, supra note 11, at 47; Hall & Seligman, supra note 49, at 649; The most 
common examples are traffic offenses, but the commercial world is relevant, too.  See Albert 
W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1359, 1382–83 (2009) (“[Deferred prosecution agreements] and [nonprosecution 
agreements] do look great when compared to full enforcement of the law, but full 
enforcement of the law is unthinkable.  Every Fortune 500 company presumably has had at 
least one employee who violated a federal criminal law while carrying out his duties.  The 
law of corporate crime thus makes every Fortune 500 company subject to prosecution, 
conviction, and punishment.  In addition to the reputational damage a criminal conviction is 
likely to bring, conviction may bar a company from obtaining needed business licenses, 
holding a national bank franchise, receiving Medicaid and Medicare payments, auditing the 
accounts of publicly traded corporations, and contracting with the government.  The 
respondeat superior standard apparently empowers the Justice Department to put most 
American companies out of business and to bring the economy to a standstill—and to do so 
just as other federal agencies are bolstering failing companies to keep the economy from 
coming to a standstill.” (footnote omitted)); see also Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental 
Protection, supra note 58, at 882–83 (“Full compliance with all applicable environmental 
laws is consequently the exception rather than the norm.  Just as the EPA rarely meets 
congressional aspirations in meeting all of the deadlines in environmental laws—it meets 
roughly fourteen percent of all congressional deadlines—industry rarely meets all of those 
aspirations as reflected in the statutory and regulatory requirements themselves.  Nor does 
government itself or its contractors—as in Rocky Flats—strictly comply with environmental 
requirements.  In a recent survey, two-thirds of all corporate counsel reported that their 
companies have recently been in violation of applicable environmental laws.” (footnote 
omitted)).  Plus, widely followed, customary, unchallenged practices in the commercial, 
financial, or manufacturing industries over time can assume a presumption of legitimacy.  
That is particularly important where the law permits, or even encourages, competition among 
rivals and where it may be difficult to draw a line between lawful and unlawful conduct.  
Disagreements with how private parties see that line are better addressed administratively or 
civilly than criminally.  See U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441 n.17. 
152 See generally HALL, supra note 11, at 325–59 (discussing strict liability); Sayre, 
supra note 56, at 79. 
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address the cases where such a defense is most needed today: namely, a law 
imposing strict liability for violation of a commercial or environmental law, 
regulation, or policy.  Refusing to consider a party’s “blameworthiness,” 
Holmes wrote, makes a law “too severe for that community to bear.”153  
Given Holmes’s willingness to reconsider ancient rules that have outlived 
their justification,
154
 even Holmes may have abandoned this objection had 
he lived today. 
4. Ignorance of the Law Itself Is Blameworthy 
A final justification for the ignorance-is-no-defense rule is that 
ignorance of the law itself is blameworthy.
155
  The failure to learn where the 
line is drawn justifies punishing whoever crosses it.
156
  Of course, that 
defense of this rule equates the failure to learn where the line is with 
actually crossing it and substitutes negligence for blameworthiness.
157
  
Negligence has been sufficient to establish liability for damages in tort law 
throughout American history, but it ordinarily has not been deemed 
sufficient to establish liability under the criminal law.
158
  A criminal 
conviction uniquely embodies “the judgment of community condemnation 
which accompanies and justified its imposition.”159  Allowing negligence to 
 
153 HOLMES, supra note 11, at 47. 
154 Holmes, supra note 62. 
155 Cass, supra note 10, at 692–93. 
156 Holmes criticized this defense on the ground that it irrationally equated the failure to 
learn the law with its violation.  For a related version of this argument see id. 
157 See HOLMES, supra note 11, at 48, 50, 57–58. 
158 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 11, §§ 1.3, 5.4; Hart, supra note 138, at 421–22 
(discussing why negligence is a disfavored basis for criminal liability); Keedy, supra note 9, 
at 84–85; Otto Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 HARV. L. REV. 615, 638 (1942); 
Pilcher, supra note 138, at 1–2; Sayre, supra note 56, at 72. 
159 Hart, supra note 138, at 404. 
To engage knowingly or recklessly in conduct which is wrongful in itself and which has, in fact, 
been condemned as a crime is either to fail to comprehend the community’s accepted moral 
values or else squarely to challenge them.  The maxim, Ignorantia legis neminem excusat, 
expresses the wholly defensible and, indeed, essential principle that the action, in either event, is 
blameworthy.  If, however, the criminal law adheres to this maxim when it moves from the 
condemnation of those things which are mala in se to the condemnation of those things which 
are merely mala prohibita, it necessarily shifts its ground from a demand that every responsible 
member of the community understand and respect the community’s moral values to a demand 
that everyone know and understand what is written in the statute books.  Such a demand is toto 
coelo different.  In no respect is contemporary law subject to greater reproach than for its 
obtuseness to this fact. 
Id. at 419. 
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satisfy blameworthiness in the criminal law takes in a far larger scope of 
conduct than the criminal law historically has thought justified.
160
 
That principle still makes sense today.  Labeling someone as a 
“criminal” has an altogether different meaning than calling someone 
“negligent.”  A “criminal” is someone who, for whatever reason, 
intentionally breaks the law, violates community norms, harms people and 
their property, and damages the sense of trust and comfort that allows 
neighbors to avoid barricading themselves into their homes.  A negligent 
person is just sloppy.  We avoid such people because they are unsafe, 
bothersome, a nuisance.  We avoid criminals because we fear them and fear 
that they (and their associates) may be evil.  The term “criminal” always has 
had a special meaning in American society.  Negligent conduct falls far 
short of the proper use of that term.
161
 
B. THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR A MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE 
Being able to criticize the rationales for the common law ignorance 
rule gets us only halfway home.  We still need to identify the legal and 
policy arguments for jettisoning that rule and allowing a defendant to raise 
a mistake of law defense. 
Let’s start with the legal argument.  That argument proceeds in four 
steps. 
First: An elementary principle of criminal law is the “rule of legality.”  
The rule provides that no conduct can be punished as a crime without a law 
clearly prohibiting that conduct
162
 and affixing a penalty to it.
163
  As 
 
160 BRICKEY, supra note 104, at 25.  Jerome Hall offers an additional defense of the rule.  
In his view, allowing this defense would undermine the role of the courts by making each 
person the arbiter of his own conduct.  See Hall, supra note 9, at 18–20.  That concern, 
however, is “exaggerated.”  Cass, supra note 10, at 692–93.   
By exempting a defendant from punishment on the ground that he operated under a mistaken 
belief as to the law, courts would not abdicate their role in interpreting the law any more than 
they do by excepting from punishment one who acted under an impression of the law sufficiently 
far from correct to render the defendant insane.  In either case, the court declares what the law is 
but also declares that the defendant is not criminally liable for violating it.  The court thus 
remains law-declarer in theory; allowing mistake of law to excuse will not impair the law-
declaring function of the courts in practice unless it impairs obedience to the law declared.  If 
allowing ignorance of a law to excuse would not lessen the deterrent effect of the law, then 
allowing a mistaken belief concerning the meaning of a law to excuse should have no greater 
adverse effect. 
Id. at 694. 
161 See supra notes 91–98 & 151–60 and accompanying text. 
162 From 1660 to 1860 (and in scattered instances thereafter) the English courts exercised 
authority to declare as crimes certain actions that were deemed contra bonos mores.  HALL, 
supra note 11, at 179.  By contrast, federal courts have lacked power to create common law 
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Professor Jerome Hall has noted, “[t]he principle of legality is in some ways 
the most fundamental of all the [criminal law’s] principles.”164 
Second: A “corollary of the principle of legality” is that a law passed 
after the conduct at issue has occurred cannot serve as a basis for 
punishment.
165
  As far as the criminal law is concerned, “there has probably 
been no more widely held value-judgment in the entire history of human 
thought than the condemnation of retroactive penal law.”166  Retroactive 
application of a new law is tantamount to having no law at all.
167
 
Third: Even a preexisting law cannot sustain criminal liability if the 
average person cannot understand what that law prohibits.  Such a law is 
not materially different from one that is kept secret or one that, like the laws 
of Caligula, is published in a location that makes it unreadable.
168
  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, “[n]o one may be 
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of 
penal statutes.  All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids.”169  For that reason, “a statute which either forbids or 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
 
crimes almost from the start.  See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
32, 33 (1812). 
163 See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 485 (1948) (refusing to allow a criminal 
penalty to be imposed on conduct when Congress had outlawed it, but had not clearly 
defined what the penalty should be). 
164 HALL, supra note 11, at 25; see id. at 27–69; see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 
451, 467–68 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  A corollary is that no one can be convicted of a 
crime without sufficient evidence proving his guilt.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
316 (1979); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204 (1960). 
165 HALL, supra note 11, at 63. 
166 Id. at 59. 
167 The Ex Post Facto Clauses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and art I, § 10, cl. 1, keep 
federal and state legislators from passing a new criminal statute to ban past conduct or to 
enhance the penalties already on the books.  Those provisions do not apply to the courts, see, 
e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001), but the Due Process Clause imposes the 
same type of restriction on courts by not allowing them to adopt an unforeseeable 
interpretation of a penal law, see, e.g., id. at 458–62; Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 
192 (1977); Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 
(1972); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
168 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“To enforce 
such a [vague] statute would be like sanctioning the practice of Caligula, who ‘published the 
law, but it was written in a very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could 
make a copy of it.’”); Hall & Seligman, supra note 49, at 650 n.39 (“[W]here the law was 
not available to the community, the principle of ‘nulla poena sine lege’ comes into play.”). 
169 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (footnote omitted). 
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application violates the first essential of due process of law.”170  Put 
differently, a law that cannot be understood might as well not exist. 
What is known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine polices the criminal 
law in this regard.  Under this doctrine, a criminal statute that “fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is 
forbidden by the statute”171 or is so indefinite that “it encourages arbitrary 
and erratic arrests and convictions,”172 is void for vagueness.173  On 
occasion the Supreme Court has used a mens rea requirement to limit the 
reach of a law that otherwise might be so broad as to be unconstitutionally 
vague.
174
  But it is questionable whether that approach actually has the 
effect of making a vague statute more understandable.  If the law is unclear 
as to what it prohibits, a person has no notice of what conduct (or actus 
reus) is illegal, regardless of the definition given to the scienter requirement 
of the law.
175
  Nonetheless, the Court has relied on this proposition to 
uphold a law that otherwise might not pass muster, so it bears on the issue 
here. 
 
170 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
171 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). 
172 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). 
173 E.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 
(1983); Grayned v. City of Rockville, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972); Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); see United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876) (“It 
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all 
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully 
detained, and who should be set at large.”).  See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, 
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) 
(discussing the historical development of the void-for-vagueness doctrine).  The Supreme 
Court has applied the doctrine with particular severity if the statute deters the exercise of 
constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390–94 (1979) (abortion); 
Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (First Amendment Free Speech Clause). 
174 See, e.g., Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952); Papachristou, 405 
U.S. 156; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101–02  (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the 
accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid . . . .  The 
requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for all 
purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain.  But it does 
relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the 
accused was unaware.”); cf. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394–96  (asserting lack of a scienter 
requirement exacerbates the problem of a vague law). 
175 Packer, supra note 63, at 123 (“The dissenting opinion [in Screws] pointed out that 
importing a mens rea requirement into the definition of the offense did nothing to make the 
definition more precise.  Accepting the ‘decent advance notice’ rationale for the vagueness 
requirement, the dissenters asked how it could help to be told that you must not do 
something ‘willfully’ if you are not told what that something is.  Their question seems 
unanswerable.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Fourth: Given those first three propositions, the conclusion follows 
naturally.  The void-for-vagueness doctrine prevents the government from 
punishing someone for violating a statute if that law does not draw a readily 
understandable line separating innocent from prohibited conduct.  That line 
sometimes can be fine, but it never can be invisible.  The rationale 
underlying that doctrine is that the government must supply everyone with 
“fair notice” of forbidden conduct before someone can be criminally 
punished for having committed it.  That rationale applies equally to the 
person who, acting in good faith and consistent with contemporary mores, 
is unaware that his conduct is unlawful.  He, too, has little or no opportunity 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the criminal law; in fact, that 
is precisely what he thought he was doing.  Yet, he was mistaken because 
the law has moved so far beyond what an average person reasonably can be 
deemed to know that it becomes unreasonable to attribute to him knowledge 
of where the law has wound up.  An exception can be made for conduct that 
universally would be deemed injurious, dangerous, or wrongful.  In those 
cases, a person could be deemed to have known that his conduct might be 
criminal and to have acted regardless of the suspicions that a reasonable 
person would or should have entertained.
176
  But where the law forbids 
conduct that has none of those characteristics, it is no less unfair to impose 
a criminal sanction upon a party who reasonably, albeit mistakenly, 
believes that his conduct is lawful than it is to punish someone whose 
conduct violates an unduly vague statute.  Neither party has the evil or 
nefarious intent that is the hallmark of culpability and that the criminal law 
seeks to curb, so neither person should be subject to condemnation and 
sanction.  Neither one purposefully chose to break a known law because 
neither one knew what the law in fact prohibited.  Neither one, therefore, 
deserves to be criminally punished. 
The teaching of the void-for-vagueness doctrine goes a long way 
toward the proper analysis of this problem.  In the typical void-for-
vagueness case, the question is whether a particular statute supplies fair 
notice.  Is a law that outlaws vagrancy, loitering, or “annoying” public 
 
176 Those exceptions describe the scenarios in which the Supreme Court has not been 
troubled by application of strict liability principles.  See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 
658 (1975) (maintenance of rat-infested food warehouses); United States v. Int’l Minerals & 
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (transportation of hazardous waste); United States v. 
Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (possession of hand grenades); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 
U.S. 277 (1943) (mislabeled sale of drugs).  The Court’s decision in United States v. Smith, 
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), is an instance in which the Court was untroubled by the 
reach of a criminal statute outlawing “piracy,” because the Court found the interpretation of 
that term to be the same throughout the world.  See infra text accompanying notes 269–73 
(discussing Smith). 
2012] RECONSIDERING THE MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE 763 
passersby sufficiently clear?
177
  What about a law that makes it a crime to 
be a “gangster”?178  Or one that combines both of those elements by 
outlawing loitering by members of a “criminal street gang”?179  In each case 
the courts must scrutinize the specific law at issue in order to gauge its 
intelligibility.   
While the problem here may appear different, any difference is only 
superficial; fundamentally, the concerns are the same.  Traditionally, the 
concern has been whether a particular statute is sufficiently clear so that 
the average person can readily understand it and remain law-abiding.  
Nowadays, the difficulty is that the entire criminal code has become 
unknowable and subject to manipulation.  In traditional void-for-vagueness 
cases the problem occurs at the retail level, when a person is charged with a 
specific crime under a vague law.  By contrast, here the problem lies at the 
wholesale level, with the entire body of federal criminal law, in all of its 
complexity, capturing conduct that maybe only a few would reasonably 
deem a crime.  The “fair notice” principle underlying the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, however, is equally applicable at both levels.  In each 
case the law has failed in its elementary task of identifying clearly the line 
separating what is outlawed from what is allowed.  If it is fundamentally 
unfair to hold someone liable for violating an unconstitutionally vague law, 
why is it not equally unjust to make that person liable for a reasonable, 
good-faith belief that his conduct was lawful?
180
  Professor Packer made 
this point well: 
If the function of the vagueness doctrine is, as is so often said in the cases, to give the 
defendant fair warning that his conduct is criminal, then one is led to suppose that 
some constitutional importance attaches to giving people such warning or at least 
making such warning available to them.  If a man does an act under circumstances 
that make the act criminal, but he is unaware of those circumstances, surely he has not 
had fair warning that his conduct is criminal.  If ‘fair warning’ is a constitutional 
requisite in terms of the language of a criminal statute, why is it not also a 
constitutional requisite so far as the defendant’s state of mind with respect to his 
activities is concerned?  Or, even more to the point, if he is unaware that his conduct 
is labeled as criminal by a statute, is he not in much the same position as one who is 
convicted under a statute which is too vague to give ‘fair warning’?  In both cases, the 
defendant is by hypothesis unblameworthy in that he has acted without advertence or 
 
177 See, e.g., Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). 
178 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
179 See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
180 “The crux of the case against ignorantia legis thus is embodied in this question: If it is 
inconsistent with basic notions of fairness to penalize one for an act that, because of the 
nonexistence, inaccessibility, or vagueness of the law, the actor believed legal when done, 
why is it fair to punish one who is ignorant of the law for any other reason?”  Cass, supra 
note 10, at 689. 
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negligent inadvertence to the possibility that his conduct might be criminal.  If 
warning to the prospective defendant is really the thrust of the vagueness doctrine, 
then it seems inescapable that disturbing questions are raised, not only about so-called 
strict liability offenses in the criminal law, but about the whole range of criminal 
liabilities that are upheld despite the defendant’s plea of ignorance of the law.
181
 
Now turn to the policy argument.  The central argument in favor of a 
rule requiring the government to prove blameworthiness (or, what would 
largely have the same effect, a rule permitting a defendant to raise a mistake 
of law defense) is that it is fundamentally unfair to punish someone who 
acted without knowledge that his conduct was illegal or inherently 
wrongful.  That is, uncritically applying the common law ignorance rule 
today often can lead to results that are unjust, ineffectual, or both.
182
  
Unjust, because imposing the stigma of a criminal conviction and allied 
punishments on someone morally blameless cannot be justified on 
retributive grounds.
183
  A person unaware of what the law forbids or what 
custom deems blameworthy by definition harbors neither ill intent nor any 
purpose to violate a known legal duty.
184
  Ineffectual, because the law 
cannot deter someone from breaking a law of which he is unaware; a person 
must know where the line is drawn in order to avoid stepping over it.  Put 
differently, deterrence cannot operate retroactively.  Society can penalize 
someone for unwittingly breaking a law, which may deter him from doing 




181 Packer, supra note 63, at 123 (footnotes omitted).  Professor Cass agrees. 
An early objection to ignorantia legis was that it embodied the same unfairness as ex post facto 
laws, at least when applied to ignorance of “positive regulations, not taught by nature.”  An 
author surveying American customs and institutions and comparing them with their European 
counterparts wrote in 1792: “Where a man is ignorant of [a positive regulation], he is in the same 
situation as if the law did not exist.  To read it to him from the tribunal, where he stands 
arraigned for the breach of it, is to him precisely the same thing as it would be to originate it at 
the time by the same tribunal for the express purpose of his condemnation.” 
Cass, supra note 10, at 687 (footnotes omitted) (quoting J. BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE 
PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE (1792), reprinted in 3 THE ANNALS 
OF AMERICA 504, 511 (1968)). 
182 See, e.g., Cass, supra note 10, at 692–93; Hughes, supra note 56, at 602; Packer, 
supra note 63, at 109. 
183 See Hart, supra note 138, at 420 (“To condemn a layman as blameworthy for a 
default of technical judgment in a matter which causes trouble even for professional judges 
is, in many cases, so manifestly beyond reason that courts have developed various makeshift 
devices to avoid condemnation in particular situations.”).  This problem is exacerbated when 
only a judicial decision can resolve whether certain conduct actually is criminal.  See P.J. 
FITZGERALD, CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT 122 (1962). 
184 Cass, supra note 10, at 684; Packer, supra note 63, at 109. 
185 Cass, supra note 10, at 684; Packer, supra note 63, at 108–09; cf. Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (refusing to apply retroactively the exclusionary rule 
adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), by stating: “We cannot say that this 
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Perhaps, the ignorance rule can be said to promote incapacitation, rather 
than retribution or deterrence, by taking off the streets people who should 
have been more wary or risk-averse and who carelessly broke the law.  But 
that argument makes a crime out of negligence, which the criminal law 
generally has refused to do.  That position likely also would induce undue 
caution in an area in which caution may not be justified.
186
  Lastly, 
justifying on incapacitative grounds the punishment of someone who was 
neither blameworthy nor negligent is not materially different from allowing 




Those arguments also may serve as a bridge to the position that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to raise this defense.  If Alexis de 
Tocqueville was right that, in the eighteenth century, every political 
question ultimately became a legal question,
188
 it also is true that, in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, every legal question becomes an issue 
of constitutional law.  So, how strong is the argument that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to assert a mistake of law claim?  It turns out that the 
argument has considerable force. 
The Supreme Court on one occasion has interpreted the Due Process 
Clause to impose an actual notice requirement as a prerequisite to a criminal 
prosecution.  The case is Lambert v. California.
189
 
In all honesty, Lambert was an odd case.  It involved a local ordinance 
in the Los Angeles municipal code making it a crime, punishable by 
imprisonment, for an ex-felon to fail to report to the sheriff after being 
present in Los Angeles for five days.  The ordinance apparently was 
designed to inform the police of the whereabouts of an ex-felon in case they 
had evidence that he or she was still involved in crime, so that the police 
could engage in surveillance.  Lambert argued that application of the 
ordinance to her violated the Due Process Clause because she had no way 
of knowing that her mere presence in town was a crime. 
 
[deterrent] purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective.  The misconduct of 
the police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will not be corrected by releasing the 
prisoners involved.”). 
186 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.17 (1978); supra note 
150. 
187 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (“Every person has a 
fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Government may not punish him unless and 
until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance 
with the relevant constitutional guarantees.”). 
188 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835) (“Scarcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question.”). 
189 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
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The Supreme Court was quite troubled by the facts of the case,
190
 
especially by the combination of these two: the ordinance created a crime of 
omission that could be committed passively, and the violation, a malum 
prohibitum offense, was not one that a person could be expected to know 
without being told.
191
  Relying on precedents dealing with the requirement 
that a party receive notice of a pending lawsuit before an adverse judgment 
could be entered,
192
 the Court, by a slim five-to-four majority, held that due 
process required that Lambert receive actual notice of the Los Angeles 
ordinance before it could be applied to her.
193
 
The Court started its analysis by noting that ignorance of the law 
generally is no excuse to a crime.
194
  But the Court then went on to add that 
“the requirement of notice” is “[e]ngrained in our concept of due process” 
and “is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend” 
against civil charges, assessments, or penalties.
195
  Moving on to analyze 
the ordinance, the Court acknowledged that local ordinances commonly 
impose registration requirements as a condition of doing business.
196
  This 
ordinance, however, was not of that ilk.  The Los Angeles ordinance was 
“entirely different” because a person could violate it by doing nothing at all.  
Because “mere presence in the city” constituted a violation, the Court 
explained, there was no reason for a person to inquire about the need to 
register.
197
  Lambert’s failure to do so, while technically a violation of the 
ordinance, nevertheless “was entirely innocent.”198  The Court therefore 
held that “actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the 
probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are 
necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand.”199  
Otherwise, the Court noted in an oblique reference to its void-for-vagueness 
 
190 In an unusual move, the Court appointed an amicus curiae to argue on behalf of 
Lambert, along with her own attorney.  The Court also had the case carried over for 
reargument, another rare occurrence.  Id. at 227. 
191 Id. at 229–30; see Hart, supra note 138, at 419–20 (discussing need to inform the 
public of an offense that is both a malum prohibitum offense and a crime of omission); 
Hughes, supra note 56, at 636 (discussing the same). 
192 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 (citing Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); 
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). 
193 Id. at 228–30. 
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precedents, “the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in 
print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.”200 
The Court has not revisited a problem like this one since the Lambert 
case.
201
  Perhaps its time has come.  The importance of a properly defined 
mens rea element of criminal liability in distinguishing blameless from 
blameworthy defendants is equally strong today.
202
  The number of offenses 
 
200 Id. at 230.  Interestingly, the reference to a law “written in print too fine to read” is 
reminiscent of the Court’s reference in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) 
(plurality opinion), to Caligula’s practice of publishing laws in a very small print.  Screws 
was a void-for-vagueness case that, like Lambert, was written by Justice William O. 
Douglas. 
201 Justice Frankfurter predicted in his dissent that the majority opinion would become 
“an isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents—a derelict on the waters of the 
law.”  Lambert, 355 U.S. at 355 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
202 The classic statement of the value of a mens rea requirement is found in Morissette.  
There, the defendant took rusted bomb casings he found in a field that happened to be 
federal property.  Prosecuted for theft, he sought to defend by establishing a good-faith belief 
that he believed the casings to have been abandoned.  The trial and circuit courts rejected his 
defense, but the Supreme Court concluded that he was entitled to present it to the jury.  In so 
ruling, the Court went on at length about the role and value of mens rea in the criminal law:   
 The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no 
provincial or transient notion.  It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief 
in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to 
choose between good and evil.  A relation between some mental element and punishment for a 
harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory “But I didn’t mean to,” 
and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and 
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution.  
Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was 
indicated by Blackstone’s sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a 
“vicious will.”  Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early pronounced the 
same principle, although a few exceptions not relevant to our present problem came to be 
recognized. 
 Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-
meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep 
and early root in American soil.  As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their 
enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify 
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the 
offense that it required no statutory affirmation.  Courts, with little hesitation or division, found 
an implication of the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law.  The 
unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be 
conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions 
of the requisite but elusive mental element.  However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the 
purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the 
instruction of juries around such terms as “felonious intent,” “criminal intent,” “malice 
aforethought,” “guilty knowledge,” “fraudulent intent,” “wilfulness,” “scienter,” to denote guilty 
knowledge, or “mens rea,” to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.  By use or 
combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who were not 
blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes. 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–52 (1953) (footnotes omitted). 
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that lack a properly defined scienter element has increased considerably.  
And the difficulty facing many members of the public today in knowing 
what the law requires is at least as acute as the one in Lambert.  Today, 
there is not just one local ordinance, but a goodly number of local, state, 
and federal criminal laws governing conduct that no reasonable person 
readily would believe is criminal.
203
  If the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
discussed in cases such as Connally
204
 and the notice principles discussed in 
Lambert make sense when applied to a single law, they also make sense 
when applied to the entirety of the criminal code.  In each case, imprisoning 
a person who is morally blameless not only violates longstanding principles 
of fairness, not only engenders disrespect for the criminal law, and not only 
fails to promote the retributive or deterrent purposes of the criminal law, but 
it also creates a risk of a haphazard or lottery-like system of enforcement, 
one in which there is no rational basis for distinguishing the few who are 
caught from the rest for whom ignorance is not just bliss but freedom.
205
 
The strongest objection rests on a small number of cases that the 
Supreme Court decided early in the twentieth century dealing with 
challenges to the constitutionality of public welfare offenses: Shevlin-
Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,
206
 United States v. Balint,
207
 and United States 
 
203 See supra text accompanying notes 72–88.  As discussed below, the problem extends 
to the potential violation of a foreign nation’s laws.  See infra Part II.D. 
204 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). 
205 Henry Hart noted that certain “evils” attendant upon forcing parties to rely on the 
discretion of prosecutors are “at their most acute in the sphere of regulation of conduct 
which is not intrinsically wrongful,” as with regulatory crimes.  Hart, supra note 138, at 429. 
The stupidity and injustice of the thoughtless multiplication of minor crimes receives its most 
impressive demonstration in police stations and prosecutors’ offices.  Invariably, staffs are 
inadequate for enforcement of all the criminal statutes which the legislature in its unwisdom 
chooses to enact.  Accordingly, many of the statutes go largely unenforced. To this extent, their 
enactment is rendered futile.  But it proves also to be worse than futile.  For statutes usually do 
not become a complete dead letter.  What happens is that they are enforced sporadically, either as 
a matter of deliberate policy to proceed only on private complaint, or as a matter of the accident 
of what comes to official attention or is forced upon it.  Sporadic enforcement is an instrument of 
tyranny when enforcement officers are dishonest.  It has an inescapable residuum of injustice in 
the hands even of the best-intentioned officers.  A selection for prosecution among equally guilty 
violators entails not only inequality, but the exercise, necessarily, of an unguided and, hence, 
unprincipled discretion. 
Id. at 428–29. 
206 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (holding that a corporation can be convicted for trespass without 
proof of criminal intent). 
207 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (holding that a real person can be convicted of the sale of 
narcotics without a tax stamp without proof that he knew that the substance was a narcotic); 
see also United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922) (Balint companion case) (holding 
that a physician can be convicted of distributing a controlled substance not “in the course of 
his professional practice” without proof that he knew this his actions exceeded that limit). 
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v. Dotterweich.
208
  The Court dealt with the issue of whether the Due 
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant had a 
“guilty mind” to be convicted of a crime.  In each case the Court declined to 
impose a mens rea requirement as a matter of constitutional law.
209
  In fact, 
despite the impressive pedigree that the mens rea doctrine had at common 
law, the Court’s opinions gave short shrift to a claim based on the Due 
Process Clause.  The Court has never overruled those cases, and the law 
remains in the state that it occupied in the 1920s.
210
 
For two reasons, however, the cases from Shevlin-Carpenter to 
Dotterweich do not foreclose the Court from recognizing a mistake of law 
defense based on the Due Process Clause.  First: The issue here is not 
 
208 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (holding that the president of a company can be convicted of 
distributing adulterated or misbranded drugs in interstate commerce without proof that he 
even was aware of the transaction). 
209 Those three decisions provided the authority for the Supreme Court’s later decisions 
in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), 
and United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corporation, 402 U.S. 558 (1971).  
Those cases did not directly resolve a due process challenge; they found that the law set forth 
in Shevlin-Carpenter, Balint, and Dotterweich was still controlling.  For a detailed and 
trenchant analysis of those cases, see Hart, supra note 138, at 429–35 & nn.70–78, and 
Packer, supra note 63, at 111–19. 
The rule is slightly different in First Amendment cases.  See, e.g., Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (requiring proof that a bookseller knew the content of his inventory 
before he could be convicted of distribution of obscene materials); see generally Packer, 
supra note 63, at 125 (discussing Smith).  But free speech concerns are not relevant to the 
ordinary criminal case.  Vagueness challenges to laws that do not involve free speech 
freedoms are examined in light of the particular facts of each case because, outside the First 
Amendment context, a party can challenge a statute only insofar as it applies to him and 
must show that it identifies no standard of conduct at all.  Chapman v. United States, 500 
U.S. 453, 467 (1991); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 
n.7 (1982) (collecting cases). 
210 Scholars such as Herbert Packer have been quite critical of the Supreme Court’s 
failure to discuss this issue coherently.  See Packer, supra note 63, at 107 (“Mens rea is an 
important requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.”); id. at 
110–11 (“The history of the problem in the Supreme Court is an unedifying example of how 
constitutional doctrine comes to be fashioned.  There are two lines of decision that bear on 
the issue, one of them apparently establishing that mens rea has no constitutional 
significance, or very little, and the other suggesting that in some situations, at least, it has 
considerable significance.  The odd thing about these two lines of decision is that each has 
developed almost without acknowledgement of the other’s existence.”).  Writing in 1958, 
Henry Hart was even less kind: 
Despite the unmistakable indications that the Constitution means something definite and 
something serious when it speaks of “crime,” the Supreme Court of the United States has hardly 
got to first base in working out what that something is.  From beginning to end, there is scarcely 
a single opinion by any member of the Court which confronts the question in a fashion which 
deserves intellectual respect. 
Hart, supra note 138, at 429 (footnote omitted). 
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whether due process requires the prosecution to prove—or, in what amounts 
to the same thing, requires the legislature to adopt criminal laws requiring 
proof of—evil intent on the part of the defendant.  The considerations that 
go into defining what the criminal law may require or permit as elements of 
an offense do not necessarily apply in the same way or degree when it is a 
defense to a charge that is at issue.  It would not be unreasonable to allow 
the government to forego proof that the accused intended to break the law 
when presenting its case in chief, but then to allow the defendant to prove 
that he had no such intent when offering his own defense.  It also is not 
unreasonable to deny a defendant the right to offer a mistake of law defense 
when he is charged with a crime that is inherently blameworthy, such as 
murder.  In that case, the defendant ultimately is not claiming that he made 
a good-faith mistake as to what the law proscribes.  Rather, he is hoping to 
seat a feckless or civilly disobedient jury, and the Constitution guarantees 
him neither one.  By contrast, when the accused is charged with a 
regulatory malum prohibitum offense, his claim that he made an honest 
mistake is fully consistent with the purposes that the mens rea requirement 
serves and does not offend any constitutional value. 
Second: The Supreme Court has never attempted to square its public 
welfare cases with its void-for-vagueness jurisprudence.  As Herb Packer 
once noted, the two lines of decisions have “developed almost without 
acknowledgement of the other’s existence.”211  The closest the Court has 
come to reconciling those cases was an oblique reference in Lambert.
212
  As 
noted above, bringing the two lines of cases together does not require a 
shotgun wedding.  The fair-notice principle underlying the Court’s void-
for-vagueness cases can serve as the justification for recognizing a properly 
defined mistake of law defense without needing to “retire” the Court’s 
public welfare cases. 
Finally, even if the Supreme Court were unwilling to walk back from 
its public welfare offense line of cases, the Court certainly could limit the 
harmful effect of those decisions by ruling that a person cannot be 
imprisoned unless the government has proved that he acted with some type 
of knowledge that his actions were illegal or harmful.  The Court did not 




211 Packer, supra note 63, at 110–11. 
212 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
213 The initial case in this series, Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, involved only a 
judgment for damages for cutting timber on state land in excess of a permit.  218 U.S. 57, 64 
(1910).  (The Court also found that the defendants had willfully exceeded the limits of their 
permit and thereby committed a “legal wrong.”  Id. at 69.)  The cases of United States v. 
Balint, 251 U.S. 250 (1922), United States v. Berman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), Freed, 401 U.S. 
601, and International Minerals & Chemical Corporation, 402 U.S. 558, arose on pretrial 
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it remains possible that a defendant could persuade the Court to draw the 
line, if not at conviction, then at imprisonment.
214
  Such a rule would 
ameliorate the effects of the current doctrine.  A defendant could still be 
convicted even if he made a good-faith error, but he could not be 
imprisoned for it. 
One final point in this regard.  The argument often is made that the law 
should allow some overbreadth in its criminal statutes and should entrust 
the fair enforcement of the criminal law to the “‘conscience and 
circumspection in prosecuting officers.’”215  That argument, endorsed by 
Justices Holmes and Frankfurter, is not a trivial one.  Nonetheless, it is 
mistaken.  Our legal system is based on the proposition that ours is “a 
government of laws, and not of men.”216  No one should be obliged to rely 
on prosecutorial discretion to avoid being charged with a crime.  As Henry 
Hart put it, the notion that a person must rely on the discretion of a 
prosecutor, rather than the clarity of the law, for his freedom is 
“immoral.”217 
 
motions to dismiss the indictments, so there was neither a conviction nor a sentence in any of 
those cases.  The International Minerals case also involved only a corporation as the 
defendant, so imprisonment was legally impossible.  The penalty in Dotterweich was a 
$1,500 fine and six-months’ probation.  See United States v. Buffalo Pharm. Co., 131 F.2d 
500, 501 (2d Cir. 1945), rev’d sub nom., Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277.  The penalty in Park 
also was only a fine.  421 U.S. at 666. 
214 The Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause may provide a better 
vehicle for constitutional analysis than the Due Process Clause.  The argument would be that 
no one should be imprisoned without some proof of blameworthiness or malicious intent.  
The Supreme Court has not considered this issue under the Eighth Amendment and has 
signaled a willingness to reexamine old doctrines when a new constitutional provision is at 
issue.  Compare, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (rejecting challenge to 
purely discretionary capital sentencing schemes based on the Due Process Clause), with 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (upholding challenge based on the Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to purely discretionary capital 
sentencing schemes), and compare, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), and 
Calero-Toledo v. Smith Pearson Yacht Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (rejecting Fifth 
Amendment Due Process and Takings Clause challenges to pretrial seizure and forfeiture 
laws), with Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding the Eighth Amendment 
Excessive Fines Clause prohibits excessive forfeitures). 
215 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 
(1913)). 
216 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
217
Moral, rather than crassly utilitarian, considerations re-enter the picture when the claim is 
made, as it sometimes is, that strict liability operates, in fact, only against people who are really 
blameworthy, because prosecutors only pick out the really guilty ones for criminal prosecution.  
This argument reasserts the traditional position that a criminal conviction imports moral 
condemnation.  To this, it adds the arrogant assertion that it is proper to visit the moral 
condemnation of the community upon one of its members on the basis solely of the private 
judgment of his prosecutors.  Such a circumvention of the safeguards with which the law 
surrounds other determinations of criminality seems not only irrational, but immoral as well . . . .  
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To be sure, society has confidence that the actors in the criminal 
justice system will act in good faith for the benefit of the public.  By and 
large, that confidence is justified.  Police and prosecutors ordinarily act 
responsibly in the service of protecting the public by seeing to the proper 
and reasonable enforcement of the criminal law.
218
  But “ordinarily” is not 
the same as “always.”  Perfection is not possible, but it is worth striving for, 
and in that process we can identify and correct both obvious and subtle 
flaws in our criminal statutes.  As Robert Browning put it: 
Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, 
Or what’s a heaven for?
219
 
One important way to seek the perfection that is our goal is to 
recognize that, just as law enforcement personnel can make good-faith 
mistakes in the pursuit of their mission, so, too, can ordinary citizens.  The 
“good-faith” or “reasonable mistake” doctrine that the Supreme Court has 
recognized where the exclusionary rule is concerned is a perfect illustration 
of that point.
220
  That doctrine is designed to avoid punishing the criminal 
justice system because a police officer made a reasonable mistake.  The 
point here is similar: A person should not be convicted, let alone go to 
prison, for making a reasonable mistake.  If we are willing to pardon the 
unavoidable flaws of the people who enforce our laws, we should be willing 
to extend the same grace to the remainder of the people, who suffer from 
the same shortcomings. 
 
But moral considerations in a still larger dimension are the ultimately controlling ones.  In its 
conventional and traditional applications, a criminal conviction carries with it an ineradicable 
connotation of moral condemnation and personal guilt.  Society makes an essentially parasitic, 
and hence illegitimate, use of this instrument when it uses it as a means of deterrence (or 
compulsion) of conduct which is morally neutral.  This would be true even if a statute were to be 
enacted proclaiming that no criminal conviction hereafter should ever be understood as casting 
any reflection on anybody.  For statutes cannot change the meaning of words and make people 
stop thinking what they do think when they hear the words spoken.  But it is doubly true-it is ten-
fold, a hundred-fold, a thousand-fold true when society continues to insist that some crimes are 
morally blameworthy and then tries to use the same epithet to describe conduct which is not. 
Hart, supra note 138, at 424 (footnote omitted). 
218 See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263 (2006) (noting there is a presumption 
of regularity afforded to prosecutorial decisionmaking).  Whether police and prosecutors in 
other countries are entitled to that same presumption is an entirely different question.  
Corruption may be a fact of life in some foreign nations.  Even isolated instances of 
corruption, however, can have a massive detrimental effect on the poor souls who get 
ensnared in a foreign land by a rancid criminal justice system. 
219 Andrea del Sarto, in ROBERT BROWNING, MEN AND WOMEN 184 (Oxford University 
Press, 1972) (1855). 
220 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); supra note 43 (collecting 
“reasonable mistake” cases).  
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C. THE BOUNDARIES OF A MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSE 
If the discussion above justifies a rule permitting the defendant to 
assert a mistake of law defense at trial in an appropriate case, two follow-up 
questions naturally arise: Is the defense workable—that is, how will that 
issue play out during trial?  And how do we define the cases where a 
mistake of law defense is appropriate? 
The prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
at trial, so the courts could require the prosecution to prove that the 
defendant knew that his conduct was illegal or at least blameworthy.  That 
result, while unusual, is not unheard of.  The Supreme Court generally has 
read federal statutes to require the government to prove that the defendant 
purposefully broke the law whenever it forbids conduct that is done 
“willfully.”221  That practice has become common in the case of the federal 
tax code,
222
 and the approach followed there could serve as a template for 
other criminal offenses. 
But that approach is inconsistent with the one that the Supreme Court 
follows in cases of statutory construction.  The Court reads statutes literally 
and has been unwilling to construe them to include additional elements not 
found in the text of the law.
223
  The Court, therefore, is unlikely to read a 
statute as requiring proof of purposeful illegality if the text of the law lacks 
the term “willfully.” 
Defining when a defendant may raise a mistake of law defense would 
raise a variety of definitional issues.
224
  Should it be limited to malum 
prohibitum offenses?  So-called public welfare offenses?  Petty offenses?  
Crimes not involving moral turpitude?  Or to offenses defined by reference 
to a source, such as a regulation, outside the penal code?  Reasonable 
arguments can be made for drawing the line in different locations.  
Although courts generally find it desirable to know at the outset of any such 
enterprise exactly where they will end up, the uncertainties posed by the 
line-drawing necessary to define the perimeter of a mistake of law defense 
 
221 See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998); Cheek v. United States, 
498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991).  By contrast, the term “knowingly” requires only proof of 
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense, not additional proof of knowledge that those 
acts are unlawful.  See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, 254–55 (1998) (plurality 
opinion); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994); United States v. Bailey, 444 
U.S. 394, 408 (1980). 
222 See supra note 125. 
223 See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (declining to interpret a 
statute to include proof of “intent to defraud” when the text imposes no such requirement); 
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490 (1997) (declining to require proof of “materiality” 
of falsehood as an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally 
insured bank when the text imposes no such requirement). 
224 For a discussion of some of those issues, see Hall, supra note 9, at 18–44. 
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should not prove unduly burdensome.  For most of our history the courts 
have engaged in that process in the context of other defenses, such as duress 
or necessity, entrapment, reliance on advice of government officials or 
private counsel, self-defense or defense of another, and insanity.
225
  The 
common law decisionmaking process should be able to handle that problem 
here as the courts work out over time when a mistake of law defense is 
appropriate. 
There are some general principles, however, that would be appropriate.  
To start with, a mistake of law defense would exculpate only when the 
defendant’s mistake was reasonable.226  One result of that limitation would 
be to render the defense inapplicable as a standalone defense to a crime of 
violence, because the average person would know that such conduct is 
illegal or, at a minimum, questionable.
227
  By contrast, another principle 
would be that the defense should apply to the type of regulatory or “social 
welfare offenses” that began to arise early in the twentieth century, but 
proliferated in the latter half of that period as Congress and federal 
administrative agencies began to regulate intensively the environmental, 
commercial, and safety fields.  A particular example of where it makes 
sense to allow a mistake of law defense is to a charge that a person has 
violated a regulation implementing a criminal statute.
228
  Finally, in order to 
ensure that society’s legitimate law enforcement interests are respected, it 
would make sense to place on a defendant the burden of production and 
perhaps even persuasion.
229
  Deciding when a mistake of law defense can be 
asserted might prove difficult in some cases, but the courts have proved 
themselves fully qualified to make those decisions as to other common law 
defenses, and those guidelines should help them do so. 
 
225 See supra note 20. 
226 See Keedy, supra note 9, at 84–85, 95; Perkins, supra note 11, at 52–53.  For the 
different positions on that issue, see United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 948 & n.23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976).  The qualified immunity doctrine recognized in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982), provides a useful example of how the doctrine would operate.  See Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it 
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
the law.”). 
227 See supra note 128.  By contrast, a mistake of law defense could be asserted in 
conjunction with a claim of self-defense.  For example, suppose a jurisdiction requires the 
victim of an assault to flee before using force in his defense.  If a person reasonably believed 
that he did not have to flee before defending himself in such a jurisdiction, he would be 
entitled to present his mistake of law defense to the jury. 
228 The rationale for allowing a mistake of fact defense to the alleged violation of a 
regulation is especially powerful in the case of state and local rules.  See Hall & Seligman, 
supra note 49, at 660. 
229 See supra note 140. 
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There also is a case where the decision to apply a mistake of law 
defense should be easy to recognize: namely, to the charge that a person has 
violated the law of a foreign country.  In that case, refusing to allow a 
defendant to raise a mistake of law defense is utterly irrational, so irrational, 
in fact, that the refusal clearly should be held unconstitutional. 
D. THE SPECIAL CASE INVOLVING A MISTAKE OF FOREIGN LAW 
Most criminal laws apply only to conduct that occurs within a 
sovereign’s own territory;230 most crimes are prosecuted by state or local 
authorities, and the issue of just how far a state can extend its criminal law 
generally never arises.  Were it to arise in a state criminal case, there are 
several constitutional provisions that limit a state’s ability to apply its laws 
extraterritorially,
231
 which would make this issue an academic one in all but 
the rarest state case.
232
 
But the federal government stands on a different footing.  The 
Constitution contemplates that the federal government will exercise 
sovereign authority beyond our shores,
233
 and Congress frequently has 
 
230 Each state may exercise sovereign power only within its own defined jurisdiction.  
See Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) (“No State can legislate except with 
reference to its own jurisdiction.”). 
231 Those provisions are (1) the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, see, e.g., 
Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989); (2) the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1, see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003); and (3) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, see, e.g., Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 
149, 161 n.1 (1914) (collecting cases).  Also relevant are the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  They guarantee that each state will treat all persons within its 
jurisdiction in the same manner as state residents.  E.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 
395–403 (1948).  Those sections would be unnecessary if each state could govern its own 
residents wherever they may be. 
232 Such as where a party takes an act in one state that has an effect on another state. 
233 Congress may provide for the defense of the nation from invasion, U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 15; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“[T]o exercise like Authority over all 
Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, 
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The . . . Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”); regulate foreign commerce, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; tax 
imports and exports, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. cl. 1; outlaw conduct on the “High Seas” and 
even in foreign lands, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; and empower the military to take 
aggressive action beyond our shores, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“To declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“To raise and support Armies”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 
(“To provide and maintain a Navy”).  The President is made the commander-in-chief of the 
nation’s military forces.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  He also has the power, with the 
Senate’s advice and consent, to enter into treaties and to appoint and receive ambassadors.  
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enacted laws that apply overseas.
234
  The Supreme Court also has written 
that “Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the United States”235 as an incident of sovereignty.236  As the 
result, although a state ordinarily cannot regulate the conduct of its citizens 
in other states,
237
 Congress generally can do just that.
238
 
One example of such a law is the Lacey Act.
239
  Originally enacted in 
1900, Congress passed the Lacey Act to protect each state against out-of-
state poachers.
240
  Over time, however, Congress expanded the reach of the 
law to include, for instance, importation of wildlife obtained in violation of 
foreign law and later imported into the United States.  Eventually, Congress 
enlarged the act to include even plants.  Today, the Lacey Act seeks to 
protect threatened flora and fauna both here and abroad.
241
  The rationale 
underlying the act is that recognizing foreign laws would help protect 
wildlife in foreign countries that are at risk of extinction and would 
 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  Finally, the President is vested with the 
power to execute whatever laws and treaties the Congress may adopt affecting foreign 
relations.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  A dramatic illustration of the difference between the states 
and the federal government can be seen in Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, which forbids a 
state from “enter[ing] into any Treaty, [or] Alliance.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
234 For a collection of the laws that apply extraterritorially, see CHARLES DOYLE, 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (Cong. Res. Serv., CRS 
Report for Congress Order Code 94-166 A, Aug. 11, 2006). 
235 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
236 See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437–38 (1932) (“What in England was 
the prerogative of the sovereign in this respect, pertains under our constitutional system to 
the national authority which may be exercised by the Congress by virtue of the legislative 
power to prescribe the duties of the citizens of the United States.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1914); 
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796) (separate opinion of Wilson, J.). 
237 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822–24 (1975); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 
U.S. 592, 594 (1881). 
238 See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72–73 (1941); Blackmer v. United States, 
284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54–56 (1924); United States v. 
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922) (collecting cases). 
239 16 U.S.C. § 701 (2006). 
240 See United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Todd, 735 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1984); Rupert v. United States, 187 F. 87, 89–90 (8th Cir. 
1910); United States v. Molt, 452 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 599 F.2d 1217, 
1218–20 (3d Cir. 1979); S. Rep. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981); S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 1–2 (1969). 
241 Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371–78 (2006); see, e.g., McNab, 
331 F.3d at 1238; United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 830 & n.9 (9th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 302 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Bryant, 716 F.2d 1091, 1093 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1983); Molt, 452 F. Supp. at 1203, aff’d, 599 
F.2d at 1218–20; S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 1–2. 
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To accomplish those goals, the Lacey Act regulates (inter alia) the 
“taking, possession, importation, exportation, transportation, or sale of fish 
or wildlife or plants.”243  What is most relevant here, however, is a 
provision in the Lacey Act that makes it a federal offense to take or import 
fish, wildlife, or plants “in violation of any foreign law.”244  On its face, that 
provision does not appear to create a particularly difficult interpretive 
problem for the average person, at least none greater than in the case of 
domestic American law.  But, like an iceberg, the bigger problem lies 
beneath the surface.  Consider the case of United States v. McNab.
245
 
Abner Schoenwetter and several other individuals were convicted of 
several federal offenses in connection with their purchase, importation, and 
sale of Caribbean spiny lobsters from Honduras, in violation of the Lacey 
Act.  The case began with an anonymous tip to agents of the National 
Marine and Wildlife Fishery Service that Schoenwetter intended to import, 
into the United States, Honduran lobsters that were too small to be taken 
under Honduran law and would be packed in plastic, rather than in boxes as 
required by Honduran law.  The agents contacted Honduran officials in that 
nation’s agriculture department, who confirmed that Schoenwetter’s 
shipment violated the Honduran “Fishing Law, the Industrial and Hygienic 
Sanitary Inspection Regulation for Fish Products and Resolution No. 030-
95.”246  The agents seized Schoenwetter’s cargo, and an inspection 
confirmed that a significant number of the lobsters were too small, all were 
packed in plastic, and some contained eggs and therefore could not be taken 
under Honduran law.
247
  The district court conducted a pretrial evidentiary 
 
242 See Molt, 452 F. Supp. at 1203, aff’d, 599 F.2d at 1218–20; S. Rep. No. 91-526, at 12. 
243 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d). 
244 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A).  That provision has been the source of some litigation.  
See United States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1393–94 (9th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases rejecting 
delegation challenge to the Lacey Act). 
245 331 F.3d 1228. 
246 Id. at 1232–33. 
247 Id. at 1233. 
The minister, the vice minister, the director of legal services, the director of legal affairs, the 
secretary general of the SAG [the Secretaria de Agricultura y Ganaderia], the director general of 
the DIGEPESCA [the Direccion General de Pesca y Acuicultura], and the legal advisor for the 
Servicio Nacional de Sanidad Agropecuaria (SENASA) [an agency within the SAG that is 
responsible for the enforcement of hygiene laws and regulations] confirmed that the lobsters had 
been exported illegally without first being inspected and processed.  Furthermore, the Honduran 
officials confirmed that there was a 5.5-inch size limit for lobster tails and that all catches had to 
be reported to Honduran authorities.  The Honduran officials provided certified copies of the 
laws in question.  In September of 1999 NMFS agents inspected the lobster shipment that had 
been seized earlier in the year.  The inspection confirmed that the seized lobsters were packed in 
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hearing on the issue of whether the defendants had violated Honduran law, 
as well as another post-trial evidentiary hearing on that issue.
248
  Each time 
the district court rejected the defendants’ challenges to the validity and 
interpretation of the Honduran laws and regulations.
249
  On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit, by a two-to-one vote, also spurned the defendants’ 
arguments and upheld their convictions.
250
 
Consider for a moment just what some of those defense arguments 
were.  To start with, the defendants argued that the Lacey Act term “any 
foreign law”251 incorporated only foreign statutes, not regulations.  The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument, ruling that the act “includes 
nonstatutory provisions such as Resolution 030-95 and Regulation 0008-
93.”252  The defendants also claimed that this resolution and regulation were 
invalid and could not serve as a predicate law under the Lacey Act because 
those provisions had never been properly promulgated or, since being 
adopted, had been repealed.
253
  The circuit court noted that this issue was 
complicated by a “posttrial shift in the Honduran government’s position 
regarding the validity of the laws at issue in this case.”254  Whereas before 
and during the trial the Honduran government had concluded that the 
resolution and regulation were lawful, on appeal Honduras shifted its 
position and “now maintains that the laws were invalid at the time of the 
lobster shipments or have been repealed retroactively.”255  Starting with the 
premise that the Lacey Act conviction could be upheld if Honduran law 
were valid at the time of trial, regardless of what may have happened later, 
the Eleventh Circuit refused to give effect to the new position of the 
Honduran government that its regulations were invalid. 
 
bulk plastic bags without being processed and revealed that a significant number had a tail length 
that was less than the 5.5 inches required by the Honduran size limit restriction.  In addition, 
many of the lobsters were egg-bearing or had their eggs removed. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
248 Id. at 1233–35. 
249 Id. at 1235. 
250 Id. at 1239. 
251 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
252 McNab, 331 F.3d at 1239. 
253 Id. (“The defendants contend that the Honduran laws that served as predicates for 
their convictions were invalid.  Specifically, they argue that (1) Resolution 030-95, which 
established a 5.5-inch size limit for lobsters, never had the effect of law, because it was 
promulgated improperly and has been declared void by the Honduran courts; (2) Regulation 
0008-93, which established inspection and processing requirements for the lobster fishing 
industry, was repealed in 1995, prior to the time period covered by the indictment; and (3) 
Article 70(3), which prohibits the harvesting and destruction of lobster eggs, was 
misinterpreted by the district court and was repealed retroactively in 2001.”). 
254 Id. at 1240. 
255 Id. 
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The court gave great weight to what it saw as an interest in the 
“finality” of the meaning of foreign law.  “There must be some finality with 
representations of foreign law by foreign governments.  Given the 
inevitable political changes that take place in foreign governments, if courts 
were required to maintain compliance with a foreign government’s position, 
we would be caught up in the endless task of redetermining foreign law.”256  
Giving effect to the Honduran government’s new position of the meaning of 
its own laws would undermine that interest in finality.  “Otherwise, there 
never could be any assurance when undertaking a Lacey Act prosecution 
for violations of foreign law that a conviction will not be invalidated at 
some later date if the foreign government changes its laws.”257  Allowing a 
foreign government to change its position, the court added, could encourage 
well-heeled defendants to buy a more favorable interpretation of foreign 
law.
258
  “There would cease to be any reason to enforce the Lacey Act, at 
least with respect to foreign law violations, if every change of position by a 
foreign government as to the validity of its laws could invalidate a 
conviction.”259 
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected appellants’ specific challenges to 
Honduran law.  For instance, the Eleventh Circuit refused to give effect to a 
decision of a Honduran court holding Resolution 030-95 invalid on the 
ground that it had not properly been promulgated.
260
  The Eleventh Circuit 
construed the Honduran court’s opinion as having prospective effect 
only
261—even though the Attorney General of Honduras offered a different 
interpretation of the Honduran court’s order262 and the Constitution of 
 
256 Id. at 1241. 
257 Id. at 1242. 
258 Id.  The court did state, “such is not the case here.”  Id. 
259 Id. 
260
The basis for the defendants’ argument that Resolution 030-95 never was a valid law is an 
opinion from the Honduran Court of the First Instance of Administrative Law.  In May of 2001 
the Honduran administrative law court found that Resolution 030-95 had been promulgated 
through an incorrect procedure and ordered that the resolution was entirely voided, but this is 
only for purposes of [its] annulment and future inapplicability: This Resolution does not confer 
any right to claims . . . .  Subsequently, the Honduran Court of Appeals for Administrative Law 
affirmed the lower court’s decision invalidating Resolution 030-95. 
Id. at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted). 
261 Id. 
262
The affidavit of the assistant attorney general of Honduras indicates that the decision 
annulling Resolution 030-95 does not apply retroactively and does not legalize the shipments of 
undersized lobsters retroactively.  The attorney general of Honduras, however, offers an 
alternative explanation for the prospective language in the court’s decision that favors the 
defendants.  He contends that Resolution 030-95 was annulled ab initio, that it never was a valid 
law and, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for the defendants’ convictions.  Although the dissent 
accepts his explanation that Resolution 030-95 never was binding and that the prospective 
language merely protects the Honduran government from civil liability, we believe that the 
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Honduras seemed to require that the Honduran court’s order be given 
retroactive effect.
263
  Once more, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated the 
proposition that the validity of Honduran law, and therefore the Lacey Act 
charge incorporating that law, had to be gauged at the time of trial.
264
  In 
addition, the circuit court rejected appellants’ claim that Regulation 0008-
93 also was invalid, because that regulation, as well as the statute 
authorizing that regulation, had been repealed, as evidenced by a recent 
interpretive opinion of the Honduran legislature.  The Eleventh Circuit 
disagreed with appellants’—and the Honduran Attorney General’s—
reading of Honduran law.
265
  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that 
any potential repeal of a Honduran law forbidding the taking of egg-
carrying lobsters to be irrelevant, because only the state of Honduran law at 
the time of trial mattered.
266
 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in McNab is remarkable in numerous 
respects.  It treated the district court’s ruling on a question of Honduran law 
with the same finality that normally is afforded only to state court 
judgments when challenged in federal court on habeas corpus.  It refused to 
give any weight to the intervening opinions of the Honduran courts and 
Attorney General on intricate matters of Honduran law.  And it hinted that 
the Honduran government’s new legal opinion had been bought and paid 
for.  But what is perhaps most remarkable about the Eleventh Circuit 
majority opinion is its utter lack of self-awareness of the practical effect of 
its decision. 
The majority bemoaned the prospect of having to keep up with 
changing positions taken by a foreign country as to the meaning of its own 
laws, but never once realized that private parties operate under the same 
burden.  The chore that the Eleventh Circuit found so onerous was no 
greater than the one that the McNab defendants had to deal with in the 
 
attorney general is extracting meaning from the Honduran court’s decision that is not supported 
by the language of the opinion.  In addition, although a report from the Honduran national human 
rights commissioner advised that Secretary General Paz’s testimony be disqualified as legal error 
and that Resolution 030-95 be declared void retroactively, a subsequent meeting between the 
commissioner and an NMFS agent revealed that the commissioner was unaware of the factual 
background of the prosecution at the time he rendered his report.  Furthermore, the commissioner 
said that he felt ‘pressured’ by McNabb’s representatives to issue a quick decision. 
Id. at 1243 n.28. 
263 Id. at 1244 n.30 (“Article 96 of the Honduran Constitution provides, ‘The Law does 
not have retroactive effect, except in penal matters when the new law favors the delinquent 
or the person that is prosecuted.’” (quoting CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICÁ DE HONDURAS 
art. 96)). 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 1244–46. 
266 Id. at 1246–47.  Judge Fay dissented in part.  He found Resolution 030-95 invalid, as 
the Honduran courts had concluded.  Id. at 1247–51. 
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course of a legitimate business activity.  What is more, while the court of 
appeals labored under the burden of learning a foreign nation’s substantive 
and procedural law, the only possible penalty that the court would suffer for 
making a mistake is the remote chance that the Supreme Court would 
reverse its judgment.  By contrast, the McNab defendants acted under the 
risk of the penalty of imprisonment for making a mistake of law.  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s complaint about the difficult burden that the courts and 
government would bear if the court were to allow a foreign government to 
bring to the attention of an American court a new position on a legal issue 
ignores the fact that there is no penalty imposed on a judge who makes an 
error of law.  A member of the public has the identical burden, but he or 
she faces the prospect of imprisonment if he or she makes a mistake.  In 
these circumstances, whining is not too strong a term to describe the 
Eleventh Circuit’s complaint.  The real burden is borne by the private 
parties who must find laws such as Resolution 030-95 and Regulation 0008-
93, must interpret in the first instance laws that are written in a foreign 
language and may rest on cultural, economic, or political assumptions 
without parallel in the United States, and then must keep informed about the 
actions of a foreign government’s officials as they construe and apply their 
own laws.   
The McNab case illustrates the difficulties that a person may have in 
dealing with foreign law.  Foreign nations may have as many or more 
different sources of law—e.g., bicameral legislatures, higher and lower 
courts, administrative agencies, chief legal officers serving at agencies and 
as prosecutors, senior and lower-level government officials with authority 
to enforce a program and, therefore, interpret its rules, etc.—and forms that 
those laws make take—e.g., statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, 
interpretative publications, etc.—as we see in the United States.  Those 
laws may not be accessible or published in English.  Officials in different 
departments of government, and at different levels within each department, 
may have divergent interpretations of those laws.  And those laws and their 
interpretations may change over time, perhaps nullifying the effect of a 
prior interpretation, perhaps not.  Assuming that the average citizen can 
keep track of such laws, let alone do so without a legion of attorneys at his 
or her elbow, is not merely a fiction or a “legal cliché”;267 it is lunacy.  And 
it is no argument that a party always can seek legal advice as to how to 
proceed in a foreign country.  Aside from the possibly quite limited number 
of lawyers with the knowledge, skill, or contacts to answer those questions, 
there remains the principle that due process requires that the law be capable 
of understanding by the average person.  Unless “men of common 
 
267 Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 652 (2009). 
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intelligence” can understand what a law means,268 the law might as well not 
exist.  The answer, then, to this problem is clear: No one should be forced 
to run the risk of conviction and imprisonment for making a mistake of 
foreign law. 
The Supreme Court decided an analogous issue nearly 200 years ago 
in United States v. Smith.
269
  The defendant was charged with piracy under 
an act of Congress that made it a crime to “‘commit the crime of piracy, as 
defined by the law of nations.’”270  One issue was whether international law 
defined “piracy” with sufficient clarity so that the defendant would have 
known what the statute prohibited and that his actions were outlawed.  The 
Court decided that Congress had defined that term in an understandable 
manner by referring to international law, because international law was 
unanimous on this point: robbery and murder on the high seas was piracy.  
Moreover, piracy so defined—that is, robbery and murder at sea, rather than 
on land—also was a crime at common law and under maritime law.271  
Charging Smith with piracy for committing robbery and murder, therefore, 
could not have surprised him. 
Justice Livingston dissented.  In his opinion, Congress should have 
defined piracy under federal law, rather than leave that definition to the law 
of nations, even if international law was unanimous on this point.
272
  Justice 
Livingston saw no contradiction between the need to define a federal crime 
in federal law and the proposition that everyone is presumed to know the 
law: 
[I]t is the duty of Congress to incorporate into their own statutes a definition in terms, 
and not to refer the citizens of the United States for rules of conduct to the statutes or 
 
268 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
269 18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
270 Id. at 157 (citation omitted). 
271 Id. at 158–62. 
272 Id. at 160–82 (Livingston, J., dissenting). The reason for the approach, he explained, 
was the following: 
Such a mode of proceeding would be consonant with the universal practice in this country, and 
with those feelings of humanity which are ever opposed to the putting in jeopardy the life of a 
fellow-being, unless for the contravention of a rule which has been previously prescribed, and in 
language so plain and explicit as not to be misunderstood by any one. . . .  It is not certain, that 
on examination, the crime would not be found to be more accurately defined in the code thus 
referred to, than in any writer on the law of nations; but the objection to the reference in both 
cases is the same; that it is the duty of Congress to incorporate into their own statutes a definition 
in terms, and not to refer the citizens of the United States for rules of conduct to the statutes or 
laws of any foreign country, with which it is not to be presumed that they are acquainted. 
Id. at 181–82. 
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As noted above, a mistake of law defense would not exonerate a 
defendant from robbery or murder, and the distinction drawn by Justice 
Livingston likely would not have made a difference in the Smith case.  It is 
difficult to believe that Smith thought that he was absolved from robbery 
and murder just because he was afloat at the time.  But not every case will 
be so easy to decide.  More often than not American citizens may get 
entangled in the intricacies of foreign regulatory laws, whose complexity 
may exceed our own by the proverbial mile.  In such a case, a mistake of 
law defense, like the rationale given by Justice Livingston in dissent in 
Smith, would go a long way toward preventing another miscarriage of 
justice like the one that occurred in the McNab case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Over the last sixty years, the Supreme Court has heavily regulated the 
investigative and trial stages of the criminal process and has set up an 
immovable “No Trespassing” sign over its body of work, effectively stiff-
arming the political branches from dealing with crime by making trade-offs 
between the rules governing criminal law and procedure.  The result likely 
is not what the Court intended.  By leaving the definition of crimes and 
offenses almost entirely in the hands of the political process, the Court may 
have sacrificed fairness and stability in the criminal law for regularity in 
criminal procedure.  Legislators have found that the best (or even the only) 
option open to them to address the problem of crime—or be seen as “tough” 
in doing so, as a way of avoiding critical thirty-second TV campaign 
commercials—is to make more and more conduct criminal or to punish 
more severely conduct already outlawed.  No one has ever lost an election 
by making the penal code more wide-ranging and more punitive.  The 
outcome, however, is the “overcriminalization” of the law, as well as a 
cruel and unsound criminal justice policy.
274
  After all, “[w]hat sense does it 
make,” Henry Hart once asked, “to insist upon procedural safeguards in 
criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first 
place?”275 
The proposition that a defendant should be able to raise a mistake of 
law defense to a charge that he committed a malum prohibitum crime 
sensibly balances society’s strong interest in enforcement of the law and 
 
273 Id. at 182. 
274 See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 541 (2005) (introducing a symposium of six articles about overcriminalization). 
275 Hart, supra note 138, at 431. 
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society’s even more powerful interest in not punishing morally blameless 
parties.  Allowing the courts to filter out the phony from legitimate claims 
of mistake will separate the blameworthy from the blameless and protect 
the latter.  The cost of making that distinction likely will prove minimal 
and, in any event, is worth it.  Punishing someone who is blameless is 
unjust, and that cost must be weighed, too.  However this change is made—
by the Congress through a revision of the penal code or by the courts in 
their power to define common law defenses to crimes—it should be done. 
Holmes’s insight that the law must be willing to adapt in order to 
remain rational and vibrant is still a valuable guide for criminal law 
policymaking today.  Let us move forward with that insight as our guide in 
order to stop the process of making more and more conduct a crime and to 
reconsider whether we already have gone too far.  We have the wisdom to 
choose that path in a responsible manner.  May we also have the courage, 
whatever the political winds may be, to take the necessary next step. 
 
